Institutional persistence, income inequality, and individual attitudes
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DOI: 10.1007/s10888-019-09414-w
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Takuma Kunieda & Masashi Takahashi, 2022.
"Inequality and institutional quality in a growth model,"
Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 189-213, April.
- Takuma Kunieda & Masashi Takahashi, 2019. "Inequality and Institutional Quality in a Growth Model," Discussion Paper Series 198, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University.
- Izaskun Zuazu, 2022. "Electoral systems and income inequality: a tale of political equality," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 63(2), pages 793-819, August.
- Gnangnon, Sèna Kimm, 2023. "Export Product Quality and Inclusivity in Developing Countries," EconStor Preprints 274651, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
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More about this item
Keywords
Institutional persistence; Inequality; Attitudes;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- O1 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development
- I2 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education
- H8 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues
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