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Institutional Traps And Economic Growth

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  • Mark Gradstein

Abstract

This article's point of departure is that low-quality institutions, concentration of political power and material wealth, and underdevelopment are persistent over time. Its analytical model views an equal distribution of political power as a commitment device to enhance institutional quality, thereby promoting growth. The politically powerful coalition contemplates relinquishing of its power through democratization, weighing this advantageous consequence against the limit on own appropriative ability that it entails. The possibility of two developmental paths is exhibited: with concentration of political and economic power, low-quality institutions, and slow growth; and a more equal distribution of political and economic resources, high-quality institutions, and faster growth. Copyright © 2008 the Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

Suggested Citation

  • Mark Gradstein, 2008. "Institutional Traps And Economic Growth," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 49(3), pages 1043-1066, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:49:y:2008:i:3:p:1043-1066
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