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The Coevolution Of Economic And Political Development From Monarchy To Democracy

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  • Fali Huang

Abstract

This article establishes a unified political economy model to analyze the democratization process from monarchy to oligarchy and to democracy in the context of dynamic economic development. As the predominant source of wealth evolves from land to physical capital and finally to human capital, the relative economic and hence coercive power of land owners, capitalists, and workers shifts accordingly, inducing the transition of the political system where political power is expanded from landlords to capitalists and finally to workers. A smooth transition through political compromise facilitates efficient allocation of savings in physical capital followed by efficient investment in human capital.

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  • Fali Huang, 2012. "The Coevolution Of Economic And Political Development From Monarchy To Democracy," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 53(4), pages 1341-1368, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:iecrev:v:53:y:2012:i:4:p:1341-1368
    DOI: j.1468-2354.2012.00723.x
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    3. Sima, Di & Huang, Fali, 2023. "Is democracy good for growth? — Development at political transition time matters," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
    4. Yaya, OlaOluwa S & Adekoya, Oluwasegun B. & Adesiyan, Femi, 2020. "The Persistence of Stock Market Returns during the Presidential elections in Nigeria," MPRA Paper 99390, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Stephen L. Parente & Luis Felipe Sáenz & Anna Seim, 2022. "Income, education and democracy," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 193-233, June.
    6. Mulligan, Casey B. & Tsui, Kevin K., 2015. "Political entry, public policies, and the economy," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(3), pages 377-397.
    7. Veselov, D. & Yarkin, A., 2016. "Wealth Distribution and Political Conflict in the Model of Transition from Stagnation to Growth," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 32(4), pages 30-60.

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    JEL classification:

    • O10 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General
    • O40 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - General
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State
    • N10 - Economic History - - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations - - - General, International, or Comparative

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