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The Evolution of Ideology, Fairness and Redistribution

Author

Listed:
  • Alberto Alesina

    (Harvard University)

  • Guido Cozzi

    (Durham Business School)

  • Noemi Mantovan

    (Bangor University)

Abstract

Ideas about what is "fair" influence preferences for redistribution. We study the dynamic evolution of different economies in which redistributive policies, perception of fairness, inequality and growth are jointly determined. We show how including beliefs about fairness can keep two otherwise identical countries in di¤erent development paths for a very long time. We show how different initial conditions regarding how "fair" is the same level of inequality can lead to two permanently different steady states. We also explore how bequest taxation can be an efficient way of redistributing wealth to correct "unfair" past accumulation of inequality

Suggested Citation

  • Alberto Alesina & Guido Cozzi & Noemi Mantovan, 2012. "The Evolution of Ideology, Fairness and Redistribution," Working Papers 2012_05, Durham University Business School.
    • Handle: RePEc:dur:durham:2012_05
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Endogenous Growth; Basic and Applied R&D; Endogenous Technological Change; Common Law;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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