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Political and Economic Inequities and the Shaping of Institutions and Redistribution

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  • Alberto Chong
  • Mark Gradstein

Abstract

This article studies the joint effect of political and economic inequalities on redistributive taxation and institutional quality. The theoretical model suggests that income inequality, coupled with political bias in favor of the rich, decreases redistribution and lowers institutional quality. The effect of the former is to increase productive investment, and the effect of the latter is to decrease it—with resulting ambiguous implications for economic growth. Testing these predictions empirically in a panel of countries, we find that inequality has a negative effect on both institutional quality and redistribution.

Suggested Citation

  • Alberto Chong & Mark Gradstein, 2017. "Political and Economic Inequities and the Shaping of Institutions and Redistribution," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 83(4), pages 952-971, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:soecon:v:83:y:2017:i:4:p:952-971
    DOI: 10.1002/soej.12206
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    Cited by:

    1. Fabio Sabatini & Marco Ventura & Eiji Yamamura & Luca Zamparelli, 2020. "Fairness and the Unselfish Demand for Redistribution by Taxpayers and Welfare Recipients," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 86(3), pages 971-988, January.
    2. Abdullah Almounsor & Sami Mensi, 2024. "The Relationship Between Financial Development, Institutions Quality, and Income Inequality from the Sub-Saharan Africa Countries," Journal of the Knowledge Economy, Springer;Portland International Center for Management of Engineering and Technology (PICMET), vol. 15(3), pages 14307-14338, September.

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