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Stagnation proofness in n-agent bargaining problems

Author

Listed:
  • Jaume García-Segarra

    (University of Cologne)

  • Miguel Ginés-Vilar

    (Universitat Jaume I de Castelló)

Abstract

Some bargaining solutions may remain unchanged under any extension of a bargaining set which does not affect the utopia point, despite the fact that there is room to improve the utility of at least one agent. We call this phenomenon the stagnation effect. A bargaining solution satisfies stagnation proofness if it does not suffer from the stagnation effect. We show that stagnation proofness is compatible with the restricted version of strong monotonicity (Thomson and Myerson in Int J Game Theory 9(1):37–49, 1980), weak Pareto optimality, and scale invariance. The four axioms together characterize the family of the bargaining solutions generated by strictly-increasing paths ending at the utopia point (SIPUP-solutions).

Suggested Citation

  • Jaume García-Segarra & Miguel Ginés-Vilar, 2019. "Stagnation proofness in n-agent bargaining problems," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 14(1), pages 215-224, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jeicoo:v:14:y:2019:i:1:d:10.1007_s11403-017-0212-5
    DOI: 10.1007/s11403-017-0212-5
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bargaining; Pareto optimality; Monotonicity; Stagnation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

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