IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cer/papers/wp311.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Trade Policy, Market Leaders and Endogenous Competition Intensity

Author

Listed:
  • Jan Boone
  • Delia Ionascu
  • Kresimir Zigic

Abstract

It is well known that tariff policy can alleviate the negative consequences of breaching intellectual property rights by foreign firms. Yet, the positive effect of tariff protection is thought to be the benefit firms get at the expense of consumers (at least in the short run). Using a set-up in which the intensity of market competition is endogenous, we argue that consumers can benefit from tariffs even in the short run. A high level of tariff protection alters the firms’ cost efficiency distribution and induces tougher market competition. Consumers benefit from the tariff policy, and governments that assign a high enough weight to the consumer surplus set positive tariff levels. Under protection the innovation level remains the same as under free trade but the average industry efficiency increases.

Suggested Citation

  • Jan Boone & Delia Ionascu & Kresimir Zigic, 2006. "Trade Policy, Market Leaders and Endogenous Competition Intensity," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp311, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
  • Handle: RePEc:cer:papers:wp311
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.cerge-ei.cz/pdf/wp/Wp311.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jordi Gual & Anne Perrot & Michele Polo & Patrick Rey & Klaus Schmidt & Rune Stenbacka, 2006. "An Economic Approach to Article 82," CPI Journal, Competition Policy International, vol. 2.
    2. Neary, J Peter & Leahy, Dermot, 2000. "Strategic Trade and Industrial Policy towards Dynamic Oligopolies," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(463), pages 484-508, April.
    3. Schmalensee, Richard, 1987. "Competitive advantage and collusive optima," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 351-367.
    4. Dixit, Avinash, 1984. "International Trade Policy for Oligopolistic Industries," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 94(376a), pages 1-16, Supplemen.
    5. Motta, Massimo, 1992. "Multinational firms and the tariff-jumping argument : A game theoretic analysis with some unconventional conclusions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(8), pages 1557-1571, December.
    6. Boone, Jan, 2004. "Balance of Power," CEPR Discussion Papers 4733, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Dixit, Avinash, 1988. "Anti-dumping and countervailing duties under oligopoly," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 55-68, January.
    8. Brander, James A., 1995. "Strategic trade policy," Handbook of International Economics, in: G. M. Grossman & K. Rogoff (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 27, pages 1395-1455, Elsevier.
    9. Raymond J. Deneckere & Dan Kovenock, 1992. "Price Leadership," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 59(1), pages 143-162.
      • Raymond Deneckere & Dan Kovenock, 1988. "Price Leadership," Discussion Papers 773, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    10. Kirman, Alan & Schueller, Nathalie, 1990. "Price Leadership and Discrimination in the European Car Market," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(1), pages 69-91, September.
    11. Boone, J., 2004. "Balance of Power," Other publications TiSEM d3f8cd4b-eaf0-4c1c-aed4-5, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    12. Deneckere, Raymond J & Kovenock, Dan & Lee, Robert, 1992. "A Model of Price Leadership Based on Consumer Loyalty," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(2), pages 147-156, June.
    13. Jones, Ronald W. & Takemori, Shumpei, 1989. "Foreign monopoly and optimal tariffs for the small open economy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 33(9), pages 1691-1707, December.
    14. Staiger, Robert W. & Tabellini, Guido, 1989. "Rules and discretion in trade policy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 33(6), pages 1265-1277, July.
    15. Rosenthal, Robert W, 1980. "A Model in Which an Increase in the Number of Sellers Leads to a Higher Price," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(6), pages 1575-1579, September.
    16. Compte, Olivier & Jenny, Frederic & Rey, Patrick, 2002. "Capacity constraints, mergers and collusion," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 1-29, January.
    17. Fershtman, Chaim, 1989. "Fixed rules and decision rules : Time consistency and subgame perfection," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 191-194, September.
    18. Venables, Anthony J., 1985. "Trade and trade policy with imperfect competition: The case of identical products and free entry," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(1-2), pages 1-19, August.
    19. Davidson, Carl, 1984. "Cartel stability and tariff policy," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(3-4), pages 219-237, November.
    20. Qiu, Larry D. & Lai, Edwin L. -C., 2004. "Protection of trade for innovation: the roles of Northern and Southern Tariffs," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 449-470, December.
    21. Boone, Jan, 2002. "'Be Nice, Unless it Pays to Fight': A New Theory of Price Determination with Implications for Competition Policy," CEPR Discussion Papers 3342, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    22. Julio J. Rotemberg & Garth Saloner, 1989. "Tariffs vs Quotas with Implicit Collusion," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 22(2), pages 237-244, May.
    23. Spence, Michael, 1984. "Cost Reduction, Competition, and Industry Performance," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 101-121, January.
    24. Boone, J., 2004. "Balance of power," Other publications TiSEM dcff47a3-8a29-4ec3-a752-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    25. R. W. Staiger & G. Tabellini, 1999. "Do Gatt Rules Help Governments Make Domestic Commitments?," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(2), pages 109-144, July.
    26. Boone, J., 2002. "'Be Nice Unless it Pays to Fight' : A New Theory of Price Determination with Implications for Competition Policy," Other publications TiSEM 739723a0-ffec-49c9-bef8-7, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    27. Rotemberg, Julio J & Saloner, Garth, 1990. "Collusive Price Leadership," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(1), pages 93-111, September.
    28. Glenn C. Loury, 1979. "Market Structure and Innovation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 93(3), pages 395-410.
    29. Helder Vasconcelos, 2005. "Tacit Collusion, Cost Asymmetries, and Mergers," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(1), pages 39-62, Spring.
    30. Kabiraj, Tarun & Marjit, Sugata, 2003. "Protecting consumers through protection: The role of tariff-induced technology transfer," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 113-124, February.
    31. Staiger, Robert W & Tabellini, Guido, 1987. "Discretionary Trade Policy and Excessive Protection," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 823-837, December.
    32. Rothschild, R., 1999. "Cartel stability when costs are heterogeneous," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 17(5), pages 717-734, July.
    33. Federico Etro, 2006. "Aggressive Leaders," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 37(1), pages 146-154, Spring.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Federico Etro, 2010. "Endogenous market structures and antitrust policy," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 57(1), pages 9-45, March.
    2. Federico Etro, 2011. "Endogenous Market Structures And Strategic Trade Policy," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 52(1), pages 63-84, February.
    3. Federico Etro, 2006. "Market Leaders and Industrial Policy," Working Papers 103, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Nov 2006.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Boone, Jan & Žigić, Krešimir, 2015. "Trade policy in markets with collusion: The case of North–South R&D spillovers," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 224-237.
    2. Kresimir Zigic, 2011. "Strategic Interactions in Markets with Innovative Activity: The Cases of Strategic Trade Policy and Market Leadership," CERGE-EI Books, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague, edition 1, number b06, May.
    3. Boone, Jan, 2004. "Balance of Power," CEPR Discussion Papers 4733, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Zigic, Kresimir & Maçi, Ilir, 2011. "Competition policy and market leaders," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 1042-1049, May.
    5. Žigić, Krešimir, 2011. "Does a ‘non-committed’ government always generate lower social welfare than its ‘committed’ counterpart? Strategic trade policy when consumer surplus matters," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(4), pages 533-556.
    6. Boone, J., 2004. "Balance of Power," Other publications TiSEM d3f8cd4b-eaf0-4c1c-aed4-5, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    7. Boone, Jan, 2002. "'Be Nice, Unless it Pays to Fight': A New Theory of Price Determination with Implications for Competition Policy," CEPR Discussion Papers 3342, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Boone, J., 2004. "Balance of power," Other publications TiSEM dcff47a3-8a29-4ec3-a752-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    9. Pierluigi Sabbatini, 2016. "The Coordinated Effect of a Merger with Balanced Sharing of Collusive Profits," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 345-371, September.
    10. Kresimir Zigic, 2010. "Second-Best Trade Policies, R&D Spillovers and Government (In)ability to Precommit in an Intra-Industry Trade Framework," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp427, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    11. Delia Baghdasaryan & Krešimir Žigić, 2010. "Tariffs, market conduct and government commitment," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 18(1), pages 91-122, January.
    12. Brander, James A., 1995. "Strategic trade policy," Handbook of International Economics, in: G. M. Grossman & K. Rogoff (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 27, pages 1395-1455, Elsevier.
    13. Hattori, Keisuke, 2021. "Profit-Sharing vs Price-Fixing Collusion with Heterogeneous Firms," MPRA Paper 110800, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. Belleflamme,Paul & Peitz,Martin, 2015. "Industrial Organization," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107687899, September.
    15. Filipa Mota & João Correia-da-Silva & Joana Pinho, 2023. "Public–Private Collusion," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 62(4), pages 393-417, June.
    16. Raymond J. Deneckere & Dan Kovenock, 1988. "Capacity-Constrained Price Competition When Unit Costs Differ," Discussion Papers 861, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    17. Kaplow, Louis & Shapiro, Carl, 2007. "Antitrust," Handbook of Law and Economics, in: A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell (ed.), Handbook of Law and Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 15, pages 1073-1225, Elsevier.
    18. António Brandão & Joana Pinho & Hélder Vasconcelos, 2014. "Asymmetric Collusion with Growing Demand," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 429-472, December.
    19. Davies, Stephen & Olczak, Matthew & Coles, Heather, 2011. "Tacit collusion, firm asymmetries and numbers: Evidence from EC merger cases," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 221-231, March.
    20. Angela S. Bergantino & Claudia Capozza & Mauro Capurso, 2018. "Pricing strategies: who leads and who follows in the air and rail passenger markets in Italy," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 50(46), pages 4937-4953, October.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Tariff protection; supergames; cost asymmetries; market conduct; leadership; consumer welfare;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cer:papers:wp311. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Lucie Vasiljevova (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/eiacacz.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.