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On the value of participation: endogenous emergence of social norms in a three-player ultimatum game experiment

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  • Gianluca Grimalda
  • Anirban Kar
  • Eugenio Proto

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  • Gianluca Grimalda & Anirban Kar & Eugenio Proto, 2008. "On the value of participation: endogenous emergence of social norms in a three-player ultimatum game experiment," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 55(1), pages 127-147, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:inrvec:v:55:y:2008:i:1:p:127-147
    DOI: 10.1007/s12232-007-0036-z
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Baron, David P. & Ferejohn, John A., 1989. "Bargaining in Legislatures," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 83(4), pages 1181-1206, December.
    2. Fischbacher, Urs & Fong, Christina M. & Fehr, Ernst, 2009. "Fairness, errors and the power of competition," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 527-545, October.
    3. Thomas R. Palfrey, 2005. "Laboratory Experiments in Political Economy," Working Papers 91, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..
    4. Bolton, Gary E, 1991. "A Comparative Model of Bargaining: Theory and Evidence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1096-1136, December.
    5. Vital Anderhub & Simon Gächter & Manfred Königstein, 2002. "Efficient Contracting and Fair Play in a Simple Principal-Agent Experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 5(1), pages 5-27, June.
    6. Schram, Arthur & Sonnemans, Joep, 1996. "Voter Turnout as a Participation Game: An Experimental Investigation," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 25(3), pages 385-406.
    7. repec:pri:cepsud:111palfrey is not listed on IDEAS
    8. John Kagel & Katherine Wolfe, 2001. "Tests of Fairness Models Based on Equity Considerations in a Three-Person Ultimatum Game," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 4(3), pages 203-219, December.
    9. Gary E Bolton & Jordi Brandts & Axel Ockenfels, 2005. "Fair Procedures: Evidence from Games Involving Lotteries," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 115(506), pages 1054-1076, October.
    10. Fréchette, Guillaume R. & Kagel, John H. & Lehrer, Steven F., 2003. "Bargaining in Legislatures: An Experimental Investigation of Open versus Closed Amendment Rules," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 97(2), pages 221-232, May.
    11. Thomas R. Palfrey, 2005. "Laboratory Experiments in Political Economy," Working Papers 91, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..
    12. Knez Marc J. & Camerer Colin F., 1995. "Outside Options and Social Comparison in Three-Player Ultimatum Game Experiments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 65-94, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Gaudeul, Alexia & Keser, Claudia, 2017. "The social preferences of democratically elected decision makers and the conflict between wealth generation and distribution," University of Göttingen Working Papers in Economics 327, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
    2. Mertins, Vanessa & Egbert, Henrik & Könen, Tanja, 2013. "The effects of individual judgments about selection procedures: Results from a power-to-resist game," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 112-120.
    3. Verena Kurz & Andreas Orland & Kinga Posadzy, 2018. "Fairness versus efficiency: how procedural fairness concerns affect coordination," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 21(3), pages 601-626, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Majority ultimatum; Participation; Institutions; C92; C78; D72;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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