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Analyzing Cryptocurrencies

Author

Listed:
  • Xiaofan Li

    (University of Texas at Austin)

  • Andrew B. Whinston

    (University of Texas at Austin)

Abstract

Cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin, have been an important factor in some economic activities. For example, Bitcoin is the main payment method for ransomware attackers and retailers on the Darknet. It is therefore useful to understand the features of cryptocurrencies and their economic implications. In this research, we use bitcoin, Ether, and XRP, the three cryptocurrencies with the highest market values as of this writing, as well as Libra, which is forthcoming and topical, as examples to analyze their features. Specifically, we argue that these cryptocurrencies are fundamentally different due to differences in the following factors: the identity management of their ledger writers, their consensus algorithms, and their coin supply. We discuss how these factors determine cryptocurrency performance, including security, privacy, and financial influence. We also discuss potential research topics around these cryptocurrencies that are still open.

Suggested Citation

  • Xiaofan Li & Andrew B. Whinston, 2020. "Analyzing Cryptocurrencies," Information Systems Frontiers, Springer, vol. 22(1), pages 17-22, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:infosf:v:22:y:2020:i:1:d:10.1007_s10796-019-09966-2
    DOI: 10.1007/s10796-019-09966-2
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Satish Kumar & Weng Marc Lim & Uthayasankar Sivarajah & Jaspreet Kaur, 2023. "Artificial Intelligence and Blockchain Integration in Business: Trends from a Bibliometric-Content Analysis," Information Systems Frontiers, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 871-896, April.
    2. Cheuk Hang Au & Kevin K. W. Ho & Kris. M. Y. Law & Dickson K. W. Chiu, 2024. "Critical success factors of users’ continuous intention of adopting cryptocurrency exchanges: LAS-VICT principle," Electronic Markets, Springer;IIM University of St. Gallen, vol. 34(1), pages 1-16, December.
    3. Paolo Spagnoletti & Federica Ceci & Bendik Bygstad, 2022. "Online Black-Markets: An Investigation of a Digital Infrastructure in the Dark," Information Systems Frontiers, Springer, vol. 24(6), pages 1811-1826, December.
    4. R. Ramesh & H. R. Rao, 2020. "ISF Editorial 2020," Information Systems Frontiers, Springer, vol. 22(1), pages 1-9, February.

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