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Does everyone have equal voting power?

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  • Debabrata Pal

    (Jawaharlal Nehru University)

Abstract

Banzhaf (Rutgers Law Rev 19:317–343, 1965) shows by citing a few examples that distortion in the bargaining power of the legislators may exist in the legislative body under weighted voting rules. Such a distortion leads to the incidence of unequal voting power of the citizens. In this paper, we investigate whether the distortion in the bargaining power is confined to a few weighted voting rules or is a general phenomenon. We show if the number of dominant political views (parties) present in a country is at most four, then there exists no weighted voting rule such that the distortion in the bargaining power can be avoided.

Suggested Citation

  • Debabrata Pal, 2021. "Does everyone have equal voting power?," Indian Economic Review, Springer, vol. 56(2), pages 515-525, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:inecre:v:56:y:2021:i:2:d:10.1007_s41775-021-00117-6
    DOI: 10.1007/s41775-021-00117-6
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Weighted voting rule; Banzhaf voting power; Proportional voting rule; Equal voting power; Distortion;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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