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A critical reappraisal of some voting power paradoxes

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  • Annick Laruelle
  • Federico Valenciano

Abstract

Power indices are meant to assess the power that a voting rule confers a priori to each of the decision makers who use it. In order to test and compare them, some authors have proposed ‘natural’ postulates that a measure of a priori voting power ‘should’ satisfy, the violations of which are called ‘voting power paradoxes.’ In this paper two general measures of success and decisiveness based on the voting rule and voters' behavior and some of these postulates/paradoxes test each other. As a result serious doubts are cast on the discriminating power of most voting power postulates. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005

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  • Annick Laruelle & Federico Valenciano, 2005. "A critical reappraisal of some voting power paradoxes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 125(1), pages 17-41, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:125:y:2005:i:1:p:17-41
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-005-3408-5
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    1. Kóczy, L.Á., 2006. "Voting Paradoxes and the Human Intuition," Research Memorandum 048, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    2. Freixas, Josep & Pons, Montserrat, 2008. "Circumstantial power: Optimal persuadable voters," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 186(3), pages 1114-1126, May.
    3. Arash Abizadeh & Adrian Vetta, 2021. "A Recursive Measure of Voting Power that Satisfies Reasonable Postulates," Papers 2105.03006, arXiv.org, revised May 2022.
    4. Zineb Abidi & Matthieu Leprince & Vincent Merlin, 2020. "Power Inequality in Inter-communal Structures: The Simulated Impact of a Reform in the Case of the Municipalities in Western France," Post-Print halshs-02996998, HAL.
    5. László Á. Kóczy, 2009. "Measuring voting power: The paradox of new members vs the null player axiom," Working Paper Series 0903, Óbuda University, Keleti Faculty of Business and Management.
    6. László Á. Kóczy, 2016. "Power Indices When Players can Commit to Reject Coalitions," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 77-91, August.
    7. Tobias Hiller, 2018. "The Effects of Excluding Coalitions," Games, MDPI, vol. 9(1), pages 1-7, January.
    8. Freixas, Josep & Marciniak, Dorota & Pons, Montserrat, 2012. "On the ordinal equivalence of the Johnston, Banzhaf and Shapley power indices," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 216(2), pages 367-375.
    9. Arash Abizadeh & Adrian Vetta, 2022. "The Blocker Postulates for Measures of Voting Power," Papers 2205.08368, arXiv.org.
    10. Carreras, Francesc & Freixas, Josep, 2008. "On ordinal equivalence of power measures given by regular semivalues," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 221-234, March.
    11. Maria Montero & Juan Vidal-Puga, 2012. "A Violation of Monotonicity in a Noncooperative Setting," Discussion Papers 2012-04, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    12. Arash Abizadeh & Adrian Vetta, 2023. "The blocker postulates for measures of voting power," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 60(4), pages 595-623, May.
    13. Arash Abizadeh & Adrian Vetta, 2022. "A General Framework for a Class of Quarrels: The Quarrelling Paradox Revisited," Papers 2205.08353, arXiv.org.

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