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A Concessions-Based Procedure for Meta-Bargaining Problems

Author

Listed:
  • M. Carmen Marco

    (Universidad Politécnica de Cartagena)

  • Josep E. Peris

    (Universitat d’Alacant)

  • Begoña Subiza

    (Universitat d’Alacant)

Abstract

In 1950, Nash’s seminal paper introduced the axiomatic approach to the analysis of bargaining situations. Since then, many bargaining solutions have been proposed and axiomatically analyzed. The fact that agents, when face with a bargaining problem, can come up with different solution concepts (that is, different notions of fairness and equity) was first introduced by van Damme (J Econ Theory 38:78–100, 1986) with the meta-bargaining model. In this paper we present and axiomatically analyze a procedure for solving meta-bargaining problems, which we call Unanimous–Concession. As an example, we show that the Nash solution is the result of the meta-bargaining process we define, when agents have dual egalitarian criteria. Finally, we compare, from an axiomatic point of view, our proposal with other meta-bargaining procedures.

Suggested Citation

  • M. Carmen Marco & Josep E. Peris & Begoña Subiza, 2020. "A Concessions-Based Procedure for Meta-Bargaining Problems," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 37(1), pages 105-120, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:homoec:v:37:y:2020:i:1:d:10.1007_s41412-020-00096-8
    DOI: 10.1007/s41412-020-00096-8
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bargaining problem; Procedure; Meta-bargaining; Axiomatic approach;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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