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Pitfalls on the Road to Frey’s Democracy of the Future

Author

Listed:
  • Antoaneta Dimitrova

    (Leiden University)

  • Bernard Steunenberg

    (Leiden University)

Abstract

In this article, we discuss some of the recent proposals developed by Bruno Frey for making future societies more democratic and prosperous. While sharing Frey’s conviction that new ways of involving citizens in political decision-making in representative democracies are needed, we engage in debate on his proposals on voting rights, referenda and randomized decision-making. We are critical of the random selection of office-holders proposed by Frey, suggesting it may lead to alienation by citizens from the political process and would not really address the perceptional gap between elites and the broader public. Mindful of the pitfalls inherent in the increasing use of referenda, we suggest pre-referendum deliberation rather than the post-referendum conciliation proposed by Frey. Furthermore, we believe that it is almost impossible to propose good solutions without engaging the different arguments and empirical findings exploring the substantive as well as the procedural causes of democratic discontent.

Suggested Citation

  • Antoaneta Dimitrova & Bernard Steunenberg, 2017. "Pitfalls on the Road to Frey’s Democracy of the Future," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 34(2), pages 213-222, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:homoec:v:34:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s41412-017-0045-4
    DOI: 10.1007/s41412-017-0045-4
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bernard Steunenberg, 1992. "Referendum, Initiative, and Veto Power: Budgetary Decision Making in Local Government," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(4), pages 501-529, November.
    2. Dryzek, John S. & Niemeyer, Simon, 2008. "Discursive Representation," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 102(4), pages 481-493, November.
    3. Riker, William H., 1980. "Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 74(2), pages 432-446, June.
    4. repec:bla:kyklos:v:45:y:1992:i:4:p:501-29 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Bruno S. Frey, 2017. "Proposals for a Democracy of the Future," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 1-9, April.
    6. Frey, Bruno S., 1992. "Efficiency and Democratic Political Organisation; The Case for the Referendum," Journal of Public Policy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 12(3), pages 209-222, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Democracy; Deliberation; Institutional change; Voting rights; Referenda; Randomized decision-making;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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