A Secure and Fair Protocol that Addresses Weaknesses of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Nonlinear Negotiation
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DOI: 10.1007/s10726-010-9194-6
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- Anders Clausen & Aisha Umair & Yves Demazeau & Bo Nørregaard Jørgensen, 2020. "Impact of Social Welfare Metrics on Energy Allocation in Multi-Objective Optimization," Energies, MDPI, vol. 13(11), pages 1-19, June.
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Keywords
Multi-issue negotiation; Nonlinear utility function; Fairness;All these keywords.
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