IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/tse/wpaper/31297.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Religious Co-option in Autocracy: A Theory Inspired by History

Author

Listed:
  • Auriol, Emmanuelle
  • Platteau, Jean-Philippe

Abstract

The relationship between religion and politics is explored from a theoretical standpoint, assuming that religious clerics can be coopted by the ruler acting as an autocrat. The comparative effects of decentralized versus centralized religions on the optimal level of cooperation between the autocrat and the religious clerics, which itself impinges upon political stability, is analysed. The paper shows that the presence of a decentralized body of clerics makes autocratic regimes more unstable. It also shows that in time of stability, the level of reforms is larger with a centralized religion than with a decentralized one. When the autocrat in the decentralized case pushes more reforms than in the centralized one, he always does so at the cost of stability. Historical case studies are presented that serve to illustrate the main results.

Suggested Citation

  • Auriol, Emmanuelle & Platteau, Jean-Philippe, 2016. "Religious Co-option in Autocracy: A Theory Inspired by History," TSE Working Papers 16-746, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    • Handle: RePEc:tse:wpaper:31297
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.tse-fr.eu/sites/default/files/TSE/documents/doc/wp/2016/wp_tse_746.pdf
    File Function: Full text
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ken Binmore & Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, 1986. "The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(2), pages 176-188, Summer.
    2. Daron Acemoglu & Davide Ticchi & Andrea Vindigni, 2010. "A Theory of Military Dictatorships," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(1), pages 1-42, January.
    3. Wintrobe,Ronald, 2000. "The Political Economy of Dictatorship," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521794497, November.
    4. Morelli, Massimo & Rohner, Dominic, 2015. "Resource concentration and civil wars," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 32-47.
    5. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita & Alastair Smith & Randolph M. Siverson & James D. Morrow, 2005. "The Logic of Political Survival," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262524406, December.
    6. De Luca, Giacomo & Sekeris, Petros G. & Vargas, Juan F., 2018. "Beyond divide and rule: Weak dictators, natural resources and civil conflict," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 205-221.
    7. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson & Thierry Verdier, 2004. "Alfred Marshall Lecture: Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule: A Model of Personal Rule," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 2(2-3), pages 162-192, 04/05.
    8. Victor Ginsburgh & David Throsby, 2006. "Handbook of the economics of art and culture," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/1673, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    9. Milan W. Svolik, 2009. "Power Sharing and Leadership Dynamics in Authoritarian Regimes," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(2), pages 477-494, April.
    10. Acemoglu,Daron & Robinson,James A., 2009. "Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521671422, November.
    11. North, Douglass C. & Weingast, Barry R., 1989. "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(4), pages 803-832, December.
    12. Coşgel, Metin M. & Miceli, Thomas J. & Rubin, Jared, 2012. "The political economy of mass printing: Legitimacy and technological change in the Ottoman Empire," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(3), pages 357-371.
    13. Vincenzo Bove & Mauricio Rivera, 2015. "Elite Co-optation, Repression, and Coups in Autocracies," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 41(3), pages 453-479, May.
    14. Sriya Iyer, 2016. "The New Economics of Religion," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 54(2), pages 395-441, June.
    15. Blaydes, Lisa & Chaney, Eric, 2013. "The Feudal Revolution and Europe's Rise: Political Divergence of the Christian West and the Muslim World before 1500 CE," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 107(1), pages 16-34, February.
    16. Petros Sekeris, 2011. "Endogenous elites: power structure and patron-client relationships," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 237-258, September.
    17. Joan Esteban & József Sákovics, 2008. "A Theory of Agreements in the Shadow of Conflict: The Genesis of Bargaining Power," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 65(3), pages 227-252, November.
    18. Kai A. Konrad & Stergios Skaperdas, 2007. "Succession Rules and Leadership Rents," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 51(4), pages 622-645, August.
    19. Michel Benaim & Emmanuelle Auriol, 2000. "Standardization in Decentralized Economies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(3), pages 550-570, June.
    20. Platteau, Jean-Philippe, 2008. "Religion, politics, and development: Lessons from the lands of Islam," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 329-351, November.
    21. Kai A. Konrad & Vai-Lam Mui, 2015. "The Prince – or better no prince? The Strategic Value of Appointing a Successor," Monash Economics Working Papers 15-15, Monash University, Department of Economics.
    22. Jean-Philippe Platteau & Guilia Camilotti & Emmanuelle Auriol, 2017. "Eradicating women-hurting customs: What role for social engineering?," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2017-145, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    23. Greif,Avner, 2006. "Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521671347, January.
    24. Adeel Malik, 2012. "Was the Middle East's economic descent a legal or political failure? Debating the Islamic Law Matters Thesis," Economics Series Working Papers WPS/2012-08, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    25. Platteau, Jean-Philippe, 2011. "Political Instrumentalization of Islam and the Risk of Obscurantist Deadlock," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 243-260, February.
    26. Victor Ginsburgh & David Throsby, 2013. "Handbook of the Economics of the Art and Culture," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/152408, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    27. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    28. Adeel Malik, 2012. "Was the Middle East's economic descent a legal or political failure? Debating the Islamic Law Matters Thesis," CSAE Working Paper Series 2012-08, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
    29. Auriol, Emmanuelle & Camilotti, Giula & Platteau, Jean-Philippe, 2017. "Eradicating Women-Hurting Customs: What Role for Social Engineering?," CEPR Discussion Papers 12107, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    30. Timur Kuran, 2011. "The Long Divergence: How Islamic Law Held Back the Middle East," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 9273.
    31. Alessandro Lizzeri & Nicola Persico, 2004. "Why did the Elites Extend the Suffrage? Democracy and the Scope of Government, with an Application to Britain's "Age of Reform"," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 119(2), pages 707-765.
    32. Raj M. Desai & Anders Olofsgård & Tarik M. Yousef, 2009. "The Logic Of Authoritarian Bargains," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(1), pages 93-125, March.
    33. Buringh, Eltjo & Van Zanden, Jan Luiten, 2009. "Charting the “Rise of the West”: Manuscripts and Printed Books in Europe, A Long-Term Perspective from the Sixth through Eighteenth Centuries," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 69(2), pages 409-445, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Alberto Bisin & Jared Rubin & Avner Seror & Thierry Verdier, 2024. "Culture, institutions and the long divergence," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 1-40, March.
    2. Sriya Iyer, 2022. "Religion and Discrimination: A Review Essay of Persecution and Toleration: The Long Road to Religious Freedom," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 60(1), pages 256-278, March.
    3. Laeven, Luc & Popov, Alexander & Sievert, Clara, 2024. "Is religion an inferior good? Evidence from fluctuations in housing wealth," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 217(C), pages 705-725.
    4. Auriol, Emmanuelle & Platteau, Jean-Philippe, 2017. "The Explosive Combination of Religious Decentralisation and Autocracy: the Case of Islam," CEPR Discussion Papers 11815, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Emmanuelle Auriol & Jean-Philippe Platteau, 2017. "The explosive combination of religious decentralization and autocracy," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 25(2), pages 313-350, April.
    6. Mehmood, Sultan & Seror, Avner, 2023. "Religious leaders and rule of law," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 160(C).
    7. Syed Waqar Akbar & Ajid Ur Rehman & Imran Arshad & Waseem Abbas Shaheen, 2024. "From Theory to Practice: Examining the True Impact of Institutional Quality on Innovation Commercialization," Bulletin of Business and Economics (BBE), Research Foundation for Humanity (RFH), vol. 13(1), pages 8-21.
    8. Antonis Adam & Sofia Tsarsitalidou, 2023. "Serving two masters: the effect of state religion on fiscal capacity," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 194(1), pages 181-203, January.
    9. Fourati, Maleke, 2018. "Envy and the Islamic revival: Experimental evidence from Tunisia," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(4), pages 1194-1214.
    10. Dodlova, Marina & Lucas, Viola, 2021. "Regime security and taxation in autocracies: Who is taxed and how?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
    11. Jean-Paul Carvalho & Jared Rubin & Michael Sacks, 2024. "Failed secular revolutions: religious belief, competition, and extremism," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 200(3), pages 561-586, September.
    12. Philippe Aghion & Ralph Haas & Guido Friebel & Sergei Guriev & Jan Luksic, 2017. "Introduction to the Special Issue on the Economics of the Middle East and North Africa," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 25(2), pages 141-148, April.
    13. Ahmed, Faisal Z., 2021. "Muslim conquest and institutional formation," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
    14. Seror, Avner, 2018. "A theory on the evolution of religious norms and economic prohibition," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 416-427.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Auriol, Emmanuelle & Platteau, Jean-Philippe, 2016. "Religious Seduction in Autocracy: A Theory Inspired by History," CEPR Discussion Papers 11258, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Bove, Vincenzo & Platteau, Jean-Philippe & Sekeris, Petros G., 2017. "Political repression in autocratic regimes," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 410-428.
    3. Auriol, Emmanuelle & Platteau, Jean-Philippe, 2017. "The Explosive Combination of Religious Decentralisation and Autocracy: the Case of Islam," CEPR Discussion Papers 11815, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Emmanuelle Auriol & Jean-Philippe Platteau, 2017. "The explosive combination of religious decentralization and autocracy," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 25(2), pages 313-350, April.
    5. Mulligan, Casey B. & Tsui, Kevin K., 2015. "Political entry, public policies, and the economy," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(3), pages 377-397.
    6. Gehlbach, Scott & Keefer, Philip, 2011. "Investment without democracy: Ruling-party institutionalization and credible commitment in autocracies," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 123-139, June.
    7. Emmanuelle Auriol & Jean-Philippe Platteau & Thierry Verdier, 2023. "The Quran and the Sword," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 21(5), pages 1772-1820.
    8. Platteau, Jean-Phillipe & Sekeris, Petros G., 2013. "Seduction of Religious Clerics and Violence in Autocratic Regimes - with special emphasis on Islam," NEPS Working Papers 3/2013, Network of European Peace Scientists.
    9. De Luca, Giacomo & Litina, Anastasia & Sekeris, Petros G., 2015. "Growth-friendly dictatorships," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 98-111.
    10. Alberto Bisin & Jared Rubin & Avner Seror & Thierry Verdier, 2021. "Culture, Institutions & the Long Divergence," NBER Working Papers 28488, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Ricardo Nieva, 2021. "Heterogeneous coalitions and social revolutions," Rationality and Society, , vol. 33(2), pages 229-275, May.
    12. Binzel, Christine & Link, Andreas & Ramachandran, Rajesh, 2021. "Language, Knowledge, and Growth: Evidence from Early Modern Europe," CEPR Discussion Papers 15454, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    13. Coşgel, Metin M. & Miceli, Thomas J. & Rubin, Jared, 2012. "The political economy of mass printing: Legitimacy and technological change in the Ottoman Empire," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(3), pages 357-371.
    14. Michael K Miller, 2013. "Electoral authoritarianism and democracy: A formal model of regime transitions," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 25(2), pages 153-181, April.
    15. Bjørnskov, Christian & Pfaff, Katharina, 2021. "Differences matter: The effect of coup types on physical integrity rights," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    16. Chaudhary, Latika & Rubin, Jared, 2016. "Religious identity and the provision of public goods: Evidence from the Indian Princely States," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(3), pages 461-483.
    17. Sascha O. Becker & Jared Rubin & Ludger Woessmann, 2024. "Religion and Growth," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 62(3), pages 1094-1142, September.
    18. Vincenzo Bove & Jennifer Brauner, 2016. "The demand for military expenditure in authoritarian regimes," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 27(5), pages 609-625, September.
    19. Kai A. Konrad & Vai-Lam Mui, 2015. "The Prince – or better no prince? The Strategic Value of Appointing a Successor," Monash Economics Working Papers 15-15, Monash University, Department of Economics.
    20. Daron Acemoglu & Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2020. "Institutional Change and Institutional Persistence," Working Papers 2020-127, Becker Friedman Institute for Research In Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Autocracy; instrumentalization of religion; centralized and decentralized religion; Islam; economic development; reforms;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • N40 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - General, International, or Comparative
    • O57 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Comparative Studies of Countries
    • P48 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies
    • Z12 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Religion

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:tse:wpaper:31297. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/tsetofr.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.