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A Cooperative Bargaining Approach to the Assignment Market

Author

Listed:
  • Marina Núñez

    (University of Barcelona)

  • Carles Rafels

    (University of Barcelona)

Abstract

For each assignment market, an associated bargaining problem is defined and some bargaining solutions to this problem are analyzed. For a particular choice of the disagreement point, the Nash solution and the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution coincide and give the midpoint between the buyers-optimal core allocation and the sellers-optimal core allocation, and thus they belong to the core.

Suggested Citation

  • Marina Núñez & Carles Rafels, 2008. "A Cooperative Bargaining Approach to the Assignment Market," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 17(6), pages 553-563, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:grdene:v:17:y:2008:i:6:d:10.1007_s10726-008-9111-4
    DOI: 10.1007/s10726-008-9111-4
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    References listed on IDEAS

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