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Consistent bargaining conjectures in marriage and matching

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  • Bennett, Elaine

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  • Bennett, Elaine, 1988. "Consistent bargaining conjectures in marriage and matching," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 392-407, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:45:y:1988:i:2:p:392-407
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    Cited by:

    1. Haller, Hans H. & Ioannides, Yannis M., 2001. "Propaedeutics of strategic theories of economic integration," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 215-221, February.
    2. McLaughlin, Kenneth J, 1994. "Rent Sharing in an Equilibrium Model of Matching and Turnover," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 12(4), pages 499-523, October.
    3. Ireland, Norman & Merzoni, Guido, 1999. "Economic Integration And Human Capital Investment," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 534, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    4. Bennett, Elaine, 1997. "Multilateral Bargaining Problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 151-179, May.
    5. Antonio Romero-Medina, 2005. "Equitable Selection in Bilateral Matching Markets," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 58(3), pages 305-324, May.
    6. Gersbach, Hans & Haller, Hans, 2019. "Households, markets and public choice," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 16-28.
    7. Matthew Elliott & Arun Chandrasekhar & Attila Ambrus, 2015. "Social Investments, Informal Risk Sharing, and Inequality," 2015 Meeting Papers 189, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    8. Elaine Bennett, 1986. "Multilateral Bargaining Problems," UCLA Economics Working Papers 594, UCLA Department of Economics.
    9. Robert A. Pollak, 2019. "How Bargaining in Marriage Drives Marriage Market Equilibrium," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 37(1), pages 297-321.
    10. Attila Ambrus & Arun G. Chandrasekhar & Matt Elliott, 2014. "Social Investments, Informal Risk Sharing, and Inequality," NBER Working Papers 20669, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Hans Gersbach & Hans Haller, 2006. "Voice and Bargaining Power," CESifo Working Paper Series 1668, CESifo.
    12. Hans Gersbach & Hans Haller, 2009. "The affectionate society: does competition for partners promote friendliness?," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 40(3), pages 389-403, September.
    13. Hans Gersbach & Hans Haller, 2002. "Competitive Markets, Collective Decisions and Group Formation," Discussion Papers 02-11, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
    14. Maschler, Michael, 1997. "Elaine Bennett," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 243-248, May.
    15. Mumcu, Ayse & Saglam, Ismail, 2006. "Marriage and Divorce in a Model of Matching," MPRA Paper 1907, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    16. Holloway, Garth J., 1995. "Conjectural Variations With Fewer Apologies," Working Papers 225880, University of California, Davis, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
    17. Gersbach, Hans & Haller, Hans, 2011. "Groups, collective decisions and markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(1), pages 275-299, January.
    18. Marina Núñez & Carles Rafels, 2008. "A Cooperative Bargaining Approach to the Assignment Market," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 17(6), pages 553-563, November.
    19. Ayse Mumcu & Ismail Saglam, 2008. "Marriage Formation/Dissolution and Marital Distribution in a Two-Period Economic Model of Matching with Cooperative Bargaining," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 11(4), pages 1-3.
    20. Marina Núñez & Carles Rafels, 2004. "Bargained stable allocations in assignment markets," Working Papers 153, Barcelona School of Economics.

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