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Periodic frequencies of the cycles in 2 × 2 games: evidence from experimental economics

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  • Bin Xu
  • Shuang Wang
  • Zhijian Wang

Abstract

Evolutionary dynamics provides an iconic relationship – the periodic frequency of a game is determined by the payoff matrix of the game. This paper reports the first experimental evidence to demonstrate this relationship. Evidence comes from two populations randomly-matched 2 × 2 games with 12 different payoff matrix parameters. The directions, frequencies and changes in the radius of the cycles are measured definitively. The main finding is that the observed periodic frequencies of the persistent cycles are significantly different in games with different parameters. Two replicator dynamics, standard and adjusted, are employed as predictors for the periodic frequency. Interestingly, both of the models could infer the difference of the observed frequencies well. The experimental frequencies linearly, positively and significantly relate to the theoretical frequencies, but the adjusted model performs slightly better. Copyright EDP Sciences, SIF, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Suggested Citation

  • Bin Xu & Shuang Wang & Zhijian Wang, 2014. "Periodic frequencies of the cycles in 2 × 2 games: evidence from experimental economics," The European Physical Journal B: Condensed Matter and Complex Systems, Springer;EDP Sciences, vol. 87(2), pages 1-10, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:eurphb:v:87:y:2014:i:2:p:1-10:10.1140/epjb/e2014-31074-2
    DOI: 10.1140/epjb/e2014-31074-2
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jorgen W. Weibull, 1997. "Evolutionary Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262731215, April.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Wang, Yijia & Chen, Xiaojie & Wang, Zhijian, 2017. "Testability of evolutionary game dynamics based on experimental economics data," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 486(C), pages 455-464.
    2. Wang Zhijian, 2023. "Nash equilibrium selection by eigenvalue control," Papers 2302.09131, arXiv.org.
    3. Zhijian Wang & Qinmei Yao & Yijia Wang, 2022. "Eigen mode selection in human subject game experiment," Papers 2204.08071, arXiv.org.
    4. Zhijian Wang & Bin Xu, 2014. "Cycling in stochastic general equilibrium," Papers 1410.8432, arXiv.org.
    5. Wang Zhijian, 2022. "Game Dynamics Structure Control by Design: an Example from Experimental Economics," Papers 2203.06088, arXiv.org.
    6. Wang Yijia & Wang Zhijian, 2023. "Pulse in collapse: a game dynamics experiment," Papers 2302.09336, arXiv.org.
    7. Zhijian Wang & Shujie Zhou & Qinmei Yao & Yijia Wang, 2022. "Dynamic Structure in Four-strategy Game: Theory and Experiment," Papers 2203.14669, arXiv.org.

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