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On the effects of incentive framing on bribery: evidence from an experiment in Burkina Faso

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  • Olivier Armantier
  • Amadou Boly

Abstract

While incentive framing has been shown to promote workers’ effort, little is known about how it affects other dimensions of the employer-employee relationship. This paper examines whether incentive framing can also influence workers propensity to engage in an activity disloyal to their employer: corruption. To do so, we conducted an experiment in which graders are offered a bribe to report a better grade. Three treatments are conducted by framing economically equivalent contracts as menus of bonuses, penalties, or bonuses and penalties. We find that graders are more corrupt when incentives are framed as a combination of bonuses and penalties, while no difference is found between the bonus and the penalty contracts. These results are inconsistent with both standard economic theory and labor reciprocity. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Suggested Citation

  • Olivier Armantier & Amadou Boly, 2014. "On the effects of incentive framing on bribery: evidence from an experiment in Burkina Faso," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 1-15, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:15:y:2014:i:1:p:1-15
    DOI: 10.1007/s10101-013-0135-0
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    Cited by:

    1. Giulia Mugellini & Sara Della Bella & Marco Colagrossi & Giang Ly Isenring & Martin Killias, 2021. "Public sector reforms and their impact on the level of corruption: A systematic review," Campbell Systematic Reviews, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 17(2), June.
    2. Daniele Nosenzo, 2016. "Employee incentives: Bonuses or penalties?," IZA World of Labor, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), pages 234-234, January.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bribery; Incentive framing; Experimental economics; C91; D73; M5;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • M5 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics

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