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Price competition with population uncertainty

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  • Ritzberger, Klaus

Abstract

The Bertrand paradox holds that price competition among at least two firms eliminates all profits in equilibrium, when firms have identical constant marginal costs. This assumes that the number of competitors is common knowledge among firms. If firms are uncertain about the number of their competitors, there is no pure strategy equilibrium. But in mixed strategies an equilibrium exists. In this equilibrium it takes a large market to wipe out profits. Thus, with population uncertainty, two are not enough for competition.

Suggested Citation

  • Ritzberger, Klaus, 2009. "Price competition with population uncertainty," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 145-157, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:58:y:2009:i:2:p:145-157
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Pierre Bernhard & Marc Deschamps, 2017. "On Dynamic Games with Randomly Arriving Players," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 360-385, September.
    2. Meroni, Claudia & Pimienta, Carlos, 2017. "The structure of Nash equilibria in Poisson games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 128-144.
    3. Francesco De Sinopoli & Claudia Meroni, 2019. "Poisson voting games: proportional rule," Working Papers 11/2019, University of Verona, Department of Economics.
    4. Hillenbrand, Adrian & Winter, Fabian, 2018. "Volunteering under population uncertainty," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 65-81.
    5. Adrian Hillenbrand & Tobias Werner & Fabian Winter, 2020. "Volunteering at the Workplace under Incomplete Information: Teamsize Does Not Matter," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2020_04, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    6. De Sinopoli, Francesco & Meroni, Claudia & Pimienta, Carlos, 2014. "Strategic stability in Poisson games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 46-63.
    7. Francesco De Sinopoli & Leo Ferraris & Claudia Meroni, 2024. "Group size as selection device," Working Papers 533, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics.
    8. Francesco Sinopoli & Christopher Künstler & Claudia Meroni & Carlos Pimienta, 2023. "Poisson–Cournot games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 75(3), pages 803-840, April.
      • Francesco De Sinopoli & Christopher Kunstler & Claudia Meroni & Carlos Pimienta, 2020. "Poisson-Cournot Games," Discussion Papers 2020-07, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
    9. Francesco De Sinopoli & Claudia Meroni, 2022. "Poisson voting games under proportional rule," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 58(3), pages 507-526, April.
    10. De Sinopoli, Francesco & Ferraris, Leo & Meroni, Claudia, 2024. "Poisson Search," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 112(C).
    11. Kultti Klaus, 2011. "Sellers Like Clusters," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-28, December.
    12. Werner, Tobias & Hillenbrand, Adrian & Winter, Fabian, 2020. "Volunteering at the Workplace under Incomplete Information: Team Size Does Not Matter," VfS Annual Conference 2020 (Virtual Conference): Gender Economics 224519, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.

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