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Estimating a marriage matching model with spillover effects

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  • Eugene Choo
  • Aloysius Siow

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  • Eugene Choo & Aloysius Siow, 2006. "Estimating a marriage matching model with spillover effects," Demography, Springer;Population Association of America (PAA), vol. 43(3), pages 463-490, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:demogr:v:43:y:2006:i:3:p:463-490
    DOI: 10.1353/dem.2006.0023
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Eugene Choo & Shannon Seitz & Aloysius Siow, 2008. "Marriage matching, risk sharing and spousal labor supplies," Working Papers tecipa-332, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    2. Pollak, Robert A, 1990. "Two-Sex Demographic Models," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(2), pages 399-420, April.
    3. Zhenchao Qian, 1997. "Breaking the racial barriers: Variations in interracial marriage between 1980 and 1990," Demography, Springer;Population Association of America (PAA), vol. 34(2), pages 263-276, May.
    4. Becker, Gary S, 1973. "A Theory of Marriage: Part I," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(4), pages 813-846, July-Aug..
    5. Aloysius Siow, 1998. "Differential Fecundity, Markets, and Gender Roles," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(2), pages 334-354, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Bernard Salanié & Alfred Galichon, 2012. "Cupid's Invisible Hand: Social Surplus and Identification in Matching Models," Working Papers hal-01053710, HAL.
    2. Pierre-André Chiappori & Bernard Salanié & Yoram Weiss, 2017. "Partner Choice, Investment in Children, and the Marital College Premium," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(8), pages 2109-2167, August.
    3. Anderson, Gordon & Leo, Teng Wah, 2013. "An empirical examination of matching theories: The one child policy, partner choice and matching intensity in urban China," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 468-489.
    4. Alfred Galichon & Bernard Salanié, 2022. "Cupid’s Invisible Hand: Social Surplus and Identification in Matching Models," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 89(5), pages 2600-2629.
    5. Liang Chen & Eugene Choo & Alfred Galichon & Simon Weber, 2021. "Matching Function Equilibria with Partial Assignment: Existence, Uniqueness and Estimation," Working Papers hal-03936296, HAL.
    6. Sinha, Shruti, 2018. "Identification in One-to-One Matching Models with Nonparametric Unobservables," TSE Working Papers 18-897, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    7. Kotyrlo, Elena, 2016. "Space-time dynamics of fertility and commuting," Applied Econometrics, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA), vol. 41, pages 78-95.
    8. Liang Chen & Eugene Choo & Alfred Galichon & Simon Weber, 2021. "Matching Function Equilibria with Partial Assignment: Existence, Uniqueness and Estimation," Papers 2102.02071, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2023.
    9. Gutierrez, Federico H., 2020. "A simple solution to the problem of independence of irrelevant alternatives in Choo and Siow marriage market model," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 186(C).
    10. Liang Chen & Eugene Choo & Alfred Galichon & Simon Weber, 2021. "Matching Function Equilibria with Partial Assignment: Existence, Uniqueness and Estimation," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03936296, HAL.
    11. Chiappori, Pierre-André & Salanié, Bernard & Weiss, Yoram, 2015. "Partner Choice and the Marital College Premium: Analyzing Marital Patterns Over Several Decades," CEPR Discussion Papers 10403, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. Matthews, A.P. & Garenne, M.L., 2013. "A dynamic model of the marriage market—Part 2: Simulation of marital states and application to empirical data," Theoretical Population Biology, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 86-93.
    13. Alfred Galichon & Bernard Salani'e, 2021. "Cupid's Invisible Hand: Social Surplus and Identification in Matching Models," Papers 2106.02371, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2023.
    14. Matthews, A.P. & Garenne, M.L., 2013. "A dynamic model of the marriage market—Part 1: Matching algorithm based on age preference and availability," Theoretical Population Biology, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 78-85.
    15. Aydede Yigit, 2020. "Assortative preferences in choice of major," IZA Journal of Labor Economics, Sciendo & Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH (IZA), vol. 9(1), pages 1-25, March.

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