IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/demogr/v35y1998i2p147-157.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Who gets custody?

Author

Listed:
  • Maria Cancian
  • Daniel Meyer

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Maria Cancian & Daniel Meyer, 1998. "Who gets custody?," Demography, Springer;Population Association of America (PAA), vol. 35(2), pages 147-157, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:demogr:v:35:y:1998:i:2:p:147-157
    DOI: 10.2307/3004048
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.2307/3004048
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.2307/3004048?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gary S. Becker, 1981. "A Treatise on the Family," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number beck81-1.
    2. Theodore C. Bergstrom, 1996. "Economics in a Family Way," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(4), pages 1903-1934, December.
    3. Theodore C. Bergstrom, 1996. "Economics in a Family Way," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(4), pages 1903-1934, December.
    4. P. Brown & M. Melli & M. Cancian, "undated". "Physical Custody in Wisconsin Divorce Cases, 1980–1992," Institute for Research on Poverty Discussion Papers 1133-97, University of Wisconsin Institute for Research on Poverty.
    5. Weiss, Yoram & Willis, Robert J, 1985. "Children as Collective Goods and Divorce Settlements," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 3(3), pages 268-292, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ribar, David C., 2004. "What Do Social Scientists Know About the Benefits of Marriage? A Review of Quantitative Methodologies," IZA Discussion Papers 998, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    2. Francesconi, Marco & Ghiglino, Christian & Perry, Motty, 2009. "On the Origin of the Family," IZA Discussion Papers 4637, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    3. Comanor, William S. & Phillips, Llad, 2002. "The Impact of Income and Family Structure on Delinquency," Journal of Applied Economics, Universidad del CEMA, vol. 5(2), pages 1-24, November.
    4. Francesconi, Marco & Ghiglino, Christian & Perry, Motty, 2009. "On the Origin of the Family," IZA Discussion Papers 4637, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    5. Francesconi, Marco & Ghiglino, Christian & Perry, Motty, 2016. "An evolutionary theory of monogamy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 605-628.
    6. Robert A. Pollak, 2007. "Bargaining Around the Hearth," NBER Working Papers 13142, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Malapit, Hazel Jean L., 2012. "Why do spouses hide income?," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 41(5), pages 584-593.
    8. Platteau, Jean-Philippe & Gaspart, Frederic, 2007. "The Perverse Effects of High Brideprices," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 35(7), pages 1221-1236, July.
    9. James Andreoni & Eleanor Brown & Isaac Rischall, 2003. "Charitable Giving by Married Couples Who Decides and Why Does it Matter?," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 38(1).
    10. Robert A. Pollak, 2019. "How Bargaining in Marriage Drives Marriage Market Equilibrium," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 37(1), pages 297-321.
    11. Bethmann, Dirk & Kvasnicka, Michael, 2007. "Uncertain paternity, mating market failure, and the institution of marriage," SFB 649 Discussion Papers 2007-013, Humboldt University Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649: Economic Risk.
    12. Geddes, Rick & Zak, Paul J, 2002. "The Rule of One-Third," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 31(1), pages 119-137, January.
    13. Yang-Ming Chang & Dennis L. Weisman, 2005. "Sibling Rivalry and Strategic Parental Transfers," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 71(4), pages 821-836, April.
    14. David C. Ribar, 2013. "Immigrants’ time use: a survey of methods and evidence," Chapters, in: Amelie F. Constant & Klaus F. Zimmermann (ed.), International Handbook on the Economics of Migration, chapter 20, pages 373-392, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    15. Raphaela Hyee, 2011. "Education in a Marriage Market Model without Commitment," Working Papers 683, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
    16. Cameron, Samuel, 2003. "The economic model of divorce: the neglected role of search and specific capital formation," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 303-316, July.
    17. Raphaela Hyee, 2011. "Education in a Marriage Market Model without Commitment," Working Papers 683, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
    18. Waka Cheung & Yew-Kwang Ng, 2011. "Gender Division of Labor and Alimony," Monash Economics Working Papers 17-11, Monash University, Department of Economics.
    19. Yang‐Ming Chang & Dennis L. Weisman, 2005. "Sibling Rivalry and Strategic Parental Transfers," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 71(4), pages 821-836, April.
    20. Wolff, Francois-Charles & Laferrere, Anne, 2006. "Microeconomic models of family transfers," Handbook on the Economics of Giving, Reciprocity and Altruism, in: S. Kolm & Jean Mercier Ythier (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 13, pages 889-969, Elsevier.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:demogr:v:35:y:1998:i:2:p:147-157. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.