Simulating the effect of nepotism on political risk taking and social unrest
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DOI: 10.1007/s10588-006-9008-1
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- Najib A. Mozahem, 2022. "Social cognitive theory and women’s career choices: an agent—based model simulation," Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 1-26, March.
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Keywords
Risk sensitivity; Inequality; Nepotism; Agent-based modeling; Social unrest; Terrorism;All these keywords.
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