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Simulating the effect of nepotism on political risk taking and social unrest

Author

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  • Lawrence A. Kuznar

    (Indiana University – Purdue University)

  • William Frederick

    (Indiana University – Purdue University)

Abstract

Nepotism has been the primary influence on political behavior throughout human history. Despite the spread of democracy in the 20th century, nepotistic regimes have hardly disappeared. Nepotism heavily influences political activity throughout the developing world, Middle East, and central Asia where family ties are essential for gaining access to power, state resources, and privileges. Rebelling against such nepotistic regimes is difficult and risky. RiskTaker is an agent-based model we developed for testing the influences of various social forces on risk taking behavior, including the formulation of rebellious coalitions. We use RiskTaker to examine the influence of nepotism on the distribution of wealth and social status. Nepotism heavily skews the distribution of wealth and status, leading to the formation of opposing coalitions and exacerbating social unrest.

Suggested Citation

  • Lawrence A. Kuznar & William Frederick, 2007. "Simulating the effect of nepotism on political risk taking and social unrest," Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 29-37, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:comaot:v:13:y:2007:i:1:d:10.1007_s10588-006-9008-1
    DOI: 10.1007/s10588-006-9008-1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Battalio, Raymond & Samuelson, Larry & Van Huyck, John, 2001. "Optimization Incentives and Coordination Failure in Laboratory Stag Hunt Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(3), pages 749-764, May.
    2. Ian Lustick, 2002. "PS-I: a User-Friendly Agent-Based Modeling Platform for Testing Theories of Political Identity and Political Stability," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 5(3), pages 1-7.
    3. Kuznar, Lawrence A. & Frederick, William G., 2003. "Environmental constraints and sigmoid utility: implications for value, risk sensitivity, and social status," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 293-306, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Najib A. Mozahem, 2022. "Social cognitive theory and women’s career choices: an agent—based model simulation," Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 1-26, March.

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