Principal/Two-Agent model with internal signal
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DOI: 10.1007/s10100-020-00719-0
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- Andrej Kastrin & Janez Povh & Lidija Zadnik Stirn & Janez Žerovnik, 2021. "Methodologies and applications for resilient global development from the aspect of SDI-SOR special issues of CJOR," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 29(3), pages 773-790, September.
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Keywords
Game theory; Nash equilibrium; Moral hazard; Principal-Agent model; Internal signal;All these keywords.
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