IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cpr/ceprdp/3712.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The Rise of Europe: Atlantic Trade, Institutional Change and Economic Growth

Author

Listed:
  • Acemoglu, Daron
  • Johnson, Simon
  • Robinson, James A.

Abstract

This Paper documents that the rise of (Western) Europe between 1500 and 1850 is largely accounted for by the growth of European nations with access to the Atlantic, and especially by those nations that engaged in colonialism and long distance oceanic trade. Moreover, Atlantic ports grew much faster than other West European cities, including Mediterranean ports. Atlantic trade and colonialism affected Europe both directly and indirectly by inducing institutional changes. In particular, the growth of New World, African and Asian trade after 1500 strengthened new segments of the commercial bourgeoisie and enabled these groups to demand, obtain and sustain changes in institutions to protect their property rights. Furthermore, the most significant institutional changes, and consequently the most substantial economic gains, occurred in nations where existing institutions placed some checks on the monarchy and particularly limited its control of overseas trading activities, thus enabling new merchants in these countries to benefit from Atlantic trade. Therefore, the Rise of Europe was largely the result of capitalist development driven by the interaction of late medieval institutions and the economic opportunities offered by ?Atlantic trade.?

Suggested Citation

  • Acemoglu, Daron & Johnson, Simon & Robinson, James A., 2003. "The Rise of Europe: Atlantic Trade, Institutional Change and Economic Growth," CEPR Discussion Papers 3712, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3712
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://cepr.org/publications/DP3712
    Download Restriction: CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bean, Richard, 1973. "War and the Birth of the Nation State," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 33(1), pages 203-221, March.
    2. Rajan, Raghuram G. & Zingales, Luigi, 2000. "The tyranny of inequality," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 521-558, June.
    3. Inikori, J. E., 1985. "Market Structure and Profits: A Further Rejoinder," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 45(3), pages 708-711, September.
    4. Per Krusell & José-Víctor Ríos-Rull, 1996. "Vested Interests in a Positive Theory of Stagnation and Growth," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 63(2), pages 301-329.
    5. La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert, 1999. "The Quality of Government," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(1), pages 222-279, April.
    6. Curtin,Philip D., 1984. "Cross-Cultural Trade in World History," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521269315, October.
    7. De Long, J Bradford & Shleifer, Andrei, 1993. "Princes and Merchants: European City Growth before the Industrial Revolution," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(2), pages 671-702, October.
    8. Henry Kamen, 1964. "The Decline of Castile: the last Crisis," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 17(1), pages 63-76, August.
    9. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, 2002. "Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 117(4), pages 1231-1294.
    10. Tim Leunig, 1998. "New Answers to Old Questions: Transport Costs and the Slow Adoption of Ring Spinning in Lancashire," Oxford University Economic and Social History Series _022, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
    11. Inikori, J. E., 1981. "Market Structure and the Profits of the British African Trade in the Late Eighteenth Century," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 41(4), pages 745-776, December.
    12. Edward C. Prescott & Stephen L. Parente, 1999. "Monopoly Rights: A Barrier to Riches," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1216-1233, December.
    13. Tim Leunig, 1998. "New Answers to Old Questions: Transport Costs and the Slow Adoption of Ring Spinning in Lancashire," Oxford Economic and Social History Working Papers _022, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    14. Eltis, David & Engerman, Stanley L., 2000. "The Importance of Slavery and the Slave Trade to Industrializing Britain," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 60(1), pages 123-144, March.
    15. Engerman, Stanley L., 1972. "The Slave Trade and British Capital Formation in the Eighteenth Century: A Comment on the Williams Thesis," Business History Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 46(4), pages 430-443, January.
    16. K. H. O'Rourke & J. G. Williamson, 2001. "After Columbus: Explaining the Global Trade Boom 1500-1800," CEG Working Papers 20014, Trinity College Dublin, Department of Economics.
    17. Allen, Robert C., 2001. "The Great Divergence in European Wages and Prices from the Middle Ages to the First World War," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 38(4), pages 411-447, October.
    18. Ralph Davis, 1956. "Merchant Shipping In The Economy Of The Late Seventeenth Century," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 9(1), pages 59-73, August.
    19. North, Douglass C. & Weingast, Barry R., 1989. "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(4), pages 803-832, December.
    20. Leunig, Timothy, 2001. "NEW ANSWERS TO OLD QUESTIONS: EXPLAINING THE SLOW ADOPTION OF RING SPINNING IN LANCASHIRE, 1880–l913," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 61(2), pages 439-466, June.
    21. Acemoglu, Daron & Robinson, James A., 2006. "Economic Backwardness in Political Perspective," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 100(1), pages 115-131, February.
    22. Galor, Oded & Mountford, Andrew, 2002. "Why are a Third of People Indian and Chinese? Trade, Industrialization and Demographic Transition," CEPR Discussion Papers 3136, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    23. Carlo M. Cipolla, 1952. "The Case Of A Fully Matured Economy," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 5(2), pages 178-187, December.
    24. Patrick O'Brien, 1982. "European Economic Development: The Contribution of the Periphery," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 35(1), pages 1-18, February.
    25. Antonio Ciccone & Kiminori Matsuyama, 1999. "Efficiency and Equilibrium with Dynamic Increasing Aggregate Returns Due to Demand Complementarities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(3), pages 499-526, May.
    26. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, 2001. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1369-1401, December.
    27. Bairoch, Paul, 1995. "Economics and World History," University of Chicago Press Economics Books, University of Chicago Press, edition 1, number 9780226034638, January.
    28. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James Robinson, 2005. "The Rise of Europe: Atlantic Trade, Institutional Change, and Economic Growth," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(3), pages 546-579, June.
    29. Grassby,Richard, 1995. "The Business Community of Seventeenth-Century England," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521434508, October.
    30. R. G. Lang, 1974. "Social Origins and Social Aspirations of Jacobean London Merchants," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 27(1), pages 28-47, February.
    31. Anonymous, 1969. "I. United Nations," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 23(4), pages 971-989, October.
    32. Zilibotti, Fabrizio, 1995. "A Rostovian model of endogenous growth and underdevelopment traps," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(8), pages 1569-1602, October.
    33. Rapp, Richard T., 1975. "The Unmaking of the Mediterranean Trade Hegemony: International Trade Rivalry and the Commercial Revolution," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 35(3), pages 499-525, September.
    34. de Vries,Jan & van der Woude,Ad, 1997. "The First Modern Economy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521570619, October.
    35. Douglass C. North, 1968. "Sources of Productivity Change in Ocean Shipping, 1600-1850," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 76(5), pages 953-953.
    36. J. E. Farnell, 1964. "The Navigation Act of 1651, the First Dutch War, and the London Merchant Community," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 16(3), pages 439-454, April.
    37. James A. Robinson & Daron Acemoglu, 2000. "Political Losers as a Barrier to Economic Development," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(2), pages 126-130, May.
    38. Henry Kamen, 1965. "Confiscations in the Economy of the Spanish Inquisition," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 18(3), pages 511-525, December.
    39. de Vries,Jan & van der Woude,Ad, 1997. "The First Modern Economy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521578257, October.
    40. Inikori, J. E., 1983. "Market Structure and the Profits of the British African Trade in the Late Eighteenth Century: A Rejoinder," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 43(03), pages 723-728, September.
    41. Andre Gunder Frank, 1978. "Dependent Accumulation and Underdevelopment," Palgrave Macmillan Books, Palgrave Macmillan, number 978-1-349-16014-3, December.
    42. Neal, Larry, 2000. "How it all began: the monetary and financial architecture of Europe during the first global capital markets, 1648 1815," Financial History Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 7(02), pages 117-140, October.
    43. Lucas, Robert Jr., 1988. "On the mechanics of economic development," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 3-42, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Acemoglu, Daron & Johnson, Simon & Robinson, James A., 2005. "Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth," Handbook of Economic Growth, in: Philippe Aghion & Steven Durlauf (ed.), Handbook of Economic Growth, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 385-472, Elsevier.
    2. Andrea Asoni, 2008. "Protection Of Property Rights And Growth As Political Equilibria," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(5), pages 953-987, December.
    3. Djankov, Simeon & Glaeser, Edward & La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei, 2003. "The new comparative economics," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 595-619, December.
    4. Cordoba, Juan-Carlos, 2007. "Malthus to Romer: On the Colonial Origins of the Industrial Revolution," MPRA Paper 4466, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Alexandra M. de Pleijt & Jan Luiten van Zanden, 2016. "Accounting for the “Little Divergence”: What drove economic growth in pre-industrial Europe, 1300–1800?," European Review of Economic History, European Historical Economics Society, vol. 20(4), pages 387-409.
    6. Acemoglu, Daron, 2008. "Oligarchikus és demokratikus társadalmak [Oligarchic versus democratic societies]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(7), pages 622-659.
    7. Meissner, Christopher M., 2014. "Growth from Globalization? A View from the Very Long Run," Handbook of Economic Growth, in: Philippe Aghion & Steven Durlauf (ed.), Handbook of Economic Growth, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 8, pages 1033-1069, Elsevier.
    8. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/6149 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Acemoglu, Daron & Johnson, Simon & Robinson, James & Thaicharoen, Yunyong, 2003. "Institutional causes, macroeconomic symptoms: volatility, crises and growth," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 49-123, January.
    10. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, 2002. "Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 117(4), pages 1231-1294.
    11. Daron Acemoglu, 2008. "Oligarchic Versus Democratic Societies," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 6(1), pages 1-44, March.
    12. Kevin H. O'Rourke, Leandro Prados de la Escosura and Guilllaume Daudin, 2008. "Trade and Empire, 1700-1870," The Institute for International Integration Studies Discussion Paper Series iiisdp249, IIIS.
    13. Solstad, Sondre Ulvund, 2023. "Political competition in dynamic economies," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 80(C).
    14. Johnson, Noel D. & Koyama, Mark, 2017. "States and economic growth: Capacity and constraints," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 1-20.
    15. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/6149 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Robert C. Allen, 2003. "Progress and poverty in early modern Europe," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 56(3), pages 403-443, August.
    17. Daron Acemoglu, 2006. "Modeling Inefficient Institutions," NBER Working Papers 11940, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    18. Alfani, Guido & Ryckbosch, Wouter, 2016. "Growing apart in early modern Europe? A comparison of inequality trends in Italy and the Low Countries, 1500–1800," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 143-153.
    19. Chor, Davin, 2005. "Institutions, wages, and inequality: The case of Europe and its periphery (1500-1899)," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 42(4), pages 547-566, October.
    20. Broadberry, Stephen & Ghosal, Sayantan & Proto, Eugenio, 2017. "Anonymity, efficiency wages and technological progress," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 379-394.
    21. Broadberry Stephen, 2012. "Recent Developments in the Theory of Very Long Run Growth: A Historical Appraisal," Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte / Economic History Yearbook, De Gruyter, vol. 53(1), pages 277-306, May.
    22. van Bavel, Bas, 2016. "The Invisible Hand?: How Market Economies have Emerged and Declined Since AD 500," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199608133.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Capitalism; Institutions; Social conflict; Economic growth; Political economy; Trade;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F10 - International Economics - - Trade - - - General
    • N13 - Economic History - - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations - - - Europe: Pre-1913
    • O10 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General
    • P10 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - General

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3712. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cepr.org .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.