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Advertising, Price and Hotel Service Quality: A Signalling Perspective

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  • Hsien-Hung Chiu
  • Chiang-Ming Chen

Abstract

This study investigates two main issues: the relationship between advertising expenditure and service quality, and the relationship between price and service quality in the hotel industry. The authors consider an asymmetric-information environment, in which consumers are uncertain about service quality, and address the above issues from a signalling perspective. Building on signalling and counter-signalling theory in economics, the authors propose a number of testable hypotheses and conduct an empirical study using data for Taiwanese international tourist hotels. The empirical results support the hypothesis that the advertising–quality relationship is inverted-U shaped, whereas the price–quality relationship is positive and monotonic. Hence, higher prices may signal higher service quality, whereas higher advertising expenditure does not necessarily signal higher service quality.

Suggested Citation

  • Hsien-Hung Chiu & Chiang-Ming Chen, 2014. "Advertising, Price and Hotel Service Quality: A Signalling Perspective," Tourism Economics, , vol. 20(5), pages 1013-1025, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:toueco:v:20:y:2014:i:5:p:1013-1025
    DOI: 10.5367/te.2013.0324
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Linnemer, Laurent, 2002. "Price and advertising as signals of quality when some consumers are informed," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(7), pages 931-947, September.
    2. Hao Zhao, 2000. "Raising Awareness and Signaling Quality to Uninformed Consumers: A Price-Advertising Model," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 19(4), pages 390-396, January.
    3. Fluet, Claude & Garella, Paolo G., 2002. "Advertising and prices as signals of quality in a regime of price rivalry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(7), pages 907-930, September.
    4. Philippe Bontems & Valérie Meunier, 2005. "Advertising and Price Signaling of Quality in a Duopoly with Endogenous Locations," CIE Discussion Papers 2005-10, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
    5. Kirmani, Amna & Wright, Peter, 1989. "Money Talks: Perceived Advertising Expense and Expected Product Quality," Journal of Consumer Research, Journal of Consumer Research Inc., vol. 16(3), pages 344-353, December.
    6. Caves, Richard E. & Greene, David P., 1996. "Brands' quality levels, prices, and advertising outlays: empirical evidence on signals and information costs," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 29-52.
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    Cited by:

    1. Chuanming Sun & Xingyu Chai & Qing Fan & Wenyuan Zhang, 2023. "The Impact of Hygiene Factors on Online Hotel Consumption in China during the COVID-19 Pandemic," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(4), pages 1-16, February.
    2. Cruz-Milán, Oliver & Simpson, Joseph J. & Simpson, Penny M. & Choi, Wonseok, 2016. "Reassurance or reason for concern: Security forces as a crisis management strategy," Tourism Management, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 114-125.
    3. Agnes L. DeFranco & Cristian Morosan & Nan Hua, 2017. "Moderating the impact of e-commerce expenses on financial performance in US upper upscale hotels," Tourism Economics, , vol. 23(2), pages 429-447, March.
    4. Chen, Chiang-Ming & Lin, Lin & Chiu, Hsien-Hung, 2016. "Advertising medium effect on tourist satisfaction," Annals of Tourism Research, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 268-272.
    5. Can, Ali Selcuk & Ekinci, Yuksel & Pino, Giovanni, 2021. "Joint brand advertising for emerging heritage sites," Annals of Tourism Research, Elsevier, vol. 91(C).
    6. Hongjuan Song & Yushi Jiang, 2019. "Dynamic pricing decisions by potential tourists under uncertainty: The effects of tourism advertising," Tourism Economics, , vol. 25(2), pages 213-234, March.

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