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Greek Freedom And Collective Action In Herodotus

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  • Frederick G. Whelan

Abstract

Herodotus' History recounts how the Greeks preserved their freedom as independent city-states by forming a coalition to resist invasion and conquest by Persia in 490-480 BC. This paper argues that on this occasion the Greeks faced a collective action problem, since their avoidance of being conquered was a collective good and their very freedom allowed them to act as independent, self-interested agents. It is also argued that Herodotus himself understood the dynamics of the events in these terms; his account describes the free-riding, evasiveness, maneuvering for special advantage, and other conduct that we would expect of rational actors in this situation, as well as various factors, especially the key role of the leading cities, that led to successful resistance. That rational choice theory illuminates ancient political events as narrated by an ancient writer, despite presumably great cultural differences, supports the theory's claim to universal applicability.

Suggested Citation

  • Frederick G. Whelan, 1997. "Greek Freedom And Collective Action In Herodotus," Rationality and Society, , vol. 9(2), pages 215-244, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:9:y:1997:i:2:p:215-244
    DOI: 10.1177/104346397009002004
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bianco, William T. & Bates, Robert H., 1990. "Cooperation by Design: Leadership, Structure, and Collective Dilemmas," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 84(1), pages 133-147, March.
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