The Third Place Game
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- Netanel Nissim & Aner Sela, 2020. "The Third Place Game," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 21(1), pages 64-86, January.
- Sela, Aner, 2017. "The Third Place Game," CEPR Discussion Papers 12348, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Sela, Aner, 2022.
"Effort allocations in elimination tournaments,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 211(C).
- Sela, Aner, 2021. "Effort Allocations in Elimination Tournaments," CEPR Discussion Papers 16503, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Aner Sela, 2021. "Effort Allocations in Elimination Tournaments," Working Papers 2103, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
- Guajardo, Mario & Krumer, Alex, 2023. "Format and schedule proposals for a FIFA World Cup with 12 four-team groups," Discussion Papers 2023/2, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science.
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More about this item
Keywords
All-pay auctions; elimination tournaments; third place games;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-GTH-2017-11-26 (Game Theory)
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