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The Origins of Democracy in England

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  • EDGAR KISER

    (University of Washington)

  • YORAM BARZEL

    (University of Washington)

Abstract

This article uses a rational choice model of the origins of democracy to analyze the political history of medieval England from the Norman conquest to the Hundred Years War. Why did a country just taken over by a ruler more autocratic than his predecessors develop a political system increasingly dominated by the rule of law and protodemocratic institutions? The authors argue that protodemocratic institutions such as the Magna Carta, Parliament, and an independent judiciary evolved as unintended consequences of the self-interested wealth-maximizing behavior of rulers and some of their subjects. The evolution of contractual relations between rulers and nobles, towns, and Jewish financiers is shown to be consistent with the theory. The article concludes with a discussion of why the rule of law was more secure and protodemocratic institutions were stronger and more enduring in England than in Continental monarchies.

Suggested Citation

  • Edgar Kiser & Yoram Barzel, 1991. "The Origins of Democracy in England," Rationality and Society, , vol. 3(4), pages 396-422, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:3:y:1991:i:4:p:396-422
    DOI: 10.1177/1043463191003004002
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. North, Douglass C. & Weingast, Barry R., 1989. "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(4), pages 803-832, December.
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    3. Barzel, Yoram, 1992. "Confiscation by the Ruler: The Rise and Fall of Jewish Lending in the Middle Ages," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 35(1), pages 1-13, April.
    4. Klein, Benjamin & Leffler, Keith B, 1981. "The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 615-641, August.
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    6. Hilton L. Root, 1989. "Tying the King's Hands," Rationality and Society, , vol. 1(2), pages 240-258, October.
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    Cited by:

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    2. Robert Fleck & F. Hanssen, 2009. "“Rulers ruled by women”: an economic analysis of the rise and fall of women’s rights in ancient Sparta," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 221-245, July.
    3. Mancur Olson, 1994. "Dictadura, democracia y desarrollo," Apuntes. Revista de ciencias sociales, Fondo Editorial, Universidad del Pacífico, vol. 21(35), pages 3-17.
    4. Daniel H. Krymkowski, 2000. "The Puzzle Of Lenski'S Curve," Rationality and Society, , vol. 12(1), pages 25-38, February.
    5. Hielscher, Stefan, 2015. "Ehre und Vertrauen im Fernhandel der Deutschen Hanse: Ein Beitrag zur Debatte um das Ideal des "Ehrbaren Kaufmanns" aus Sicht der Ordonomik," Discussion Papers 2015-12, Martin Luther University of Halle-Wittenberg, Chair of Economic Ethics.
    6. Boaz Moselle & Ben Polak, 1997. "A Model of a Predatory State," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1158, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    7. Yoram Barzel & Edgar Kiser, 2002. "Taxation and Voting Rights in Medieval England and France," Rationality and Society, , vol. 14(4), pages 473-507, November.
    8. Rosolino A. Candela & Vincent Geloso, 2019. "Coase and transaction costs reconsidered: the case of the English lighthouse system," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 48(3), pages 331-349, December.
    9. Robert K. Fleck & F. Andrew Hanssen, 2013. "How Tyranny Paved the Way to Democracy: The Democratic Transition in Ancient Greece," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(2), pages 389-416.
    10. Benati, Giacomo & Guerriero, Carmine & Zaina, Federico, 2022. "The origins of political institutions and property rights," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(4), pages 946-968.
    11. Peter J. Boettke & Rosolino A. Candela, 2020. "Productive specialization, peaceful cooperation and the problem of the predatory state: lessons from comparative historical political economy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 182(3), pages 331-352, March.
    12. John Hartwick, 2006. "The Control Of Land Rent In The Fortified Farming Town," Working Paper 1096, Economics Department, Queen's University.
    13. Fleck, Robert K. & Hanssen, F. Andrew, 2013. "When voice fails: Potential exit as a constraint on government quality," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 26-41.
    14. Rosolino A. Candela & Vincent J. Geloso, 2021. "Trade or raid: Acadian settlers and native Americans before 1755," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 188(3), pages 549-575, September.
    15. Apolte, Thomas, 2023. "To Democratize or not to Democratize? The Sufficient Condition for Democratization," MPRA Paper 116028, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    16. Boettke Peter J., 1994. "The Reform Trap In Economics And Politics In The Former Communist Economies," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 5(2-3), pages 267-294, June.

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