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Taxation and Voting Rights in Medieval England and France

Author

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  • Yoram Barzel

    (University of Washington, Department of Economics, Box 353330, Seattle, WA 98195-3330, USA barzel@u.washington.edu)

  • Edgar Kiser

    (Department of Sociology, Box 353340, Seattle, WA 98195-3340, USA kiser@u.washington.edu)

Abstract

We explore the relationship between voting rights and taxation in medieval England and France. We hypothesize that voting was a wealth-enhancing institution formed by the ruler in order to facilitate profitable joint projects with subjects. We predict when voting rights and tax payments will be linked to each other, as well as to the projects inducing them, and when they will become separated. We classify taxes into three types: customary, consensual and arbitrary. Customary taxes that did not require voting were dominant in both countries in the early medieval period. These payments, fixed for specific purposes, were not well suited for funding new, large-scale projects. Consensual taxation, in which voting rights and tax payments were tightly linked, was used to finance new, large-scale collective projects in both England and France. Strong rule-of-law institutions are necessary to produce such taxes. In England, where security of rule remained high, the relationship between tax payments and voting rights was maintained. In France, an increase in the insecurity of rule, and the accompanying weakening of voting institutions, produced a shift to arbitrary taxation and a disjunction between tax payments and voting rights. These observations, as well as many of the details we consider, are substantially in conformity with the predictions of our model.

Suggested Citation

  • Yoram Barzel & Edgar Kiser, 2002. "Taxation and Voting Rights in Medieval England and France," Rationality and Society, , vol. 14(4), pages 473-507, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:14:y:2002:i:4:p:473-507
    DOI: 10.1177/1043463102014004003
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. North, Douglass C. & Weingast, Barry R., 1989. "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(4), pages 803-832, December.
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    5. Tait, James, 1936. "The Medieval English Borough," History of Economic Thought Books, McMaster University Archive for the History of Economic Thought, number tait1936.
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    Cited by:

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    2. Georg D. Blind & Raji Steineck, 2021. "The missing piece in E. Cassirer’s theory of symbolic forms: the economy," Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 291-315, April.
    3. Elisa Borghi & Fabio Gatti & Donato Masciandaro, 2022. "Neither Communes nor Fiefs: King Owned Towns, Right Negotiations and Long Run Persistence. The Case of South Italy," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 22182, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    4. Mark Koyama, 2010. "The political economy of expulsion: the regulation of Jewish moneylending in medieval England," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 21(4), pages 374-406, December.
    5. Young, Andrew T., 2022. "Consent or coordination? assemblies in early medieval Europe," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).

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