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Tying the King's Hands

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  • HILTON L. ROOT

    (University of Pennsylvania)

Abstract

Historians commonly assume that the Old Regime monarchy in France attempted to eliminate corporate society in order to create liberal institutions. They also assume that the centralization of state power occurred at the expense of such corporate bodies as provincial estates, the municipal corporations, and the village communities. By contrast, I argue that those institutions were not vestiges of an earlier society waiting to be swept away by the stronger, more unified modern state. Instead, I believe that corporate bodies not only flourished under the Old Regime, but contributed to the functioning of the absolute state.

Suggested Citation

  • Hilton L. Root, 1989. "Tying the King's Hands," Rationality and Society, , vol. 1(2), pages 240-258, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:1:y:1989:i:2:p:240-258
    DOI: 10.1177/1043463189001002005
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Veitch, John M., 1986. "Repudiations and Confiscations by the Medieval State," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 46(1), pages 31-36, March.
    2. Hicks, J. R., 1969. "A Theory of Economic History," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198811633.
    3. Barro, Robert J, 1986. "Recent Developments in the Theory of Rules versus Discretion," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 96(380a), pages 23-37, Supplemen.
    4. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Hilton L. Root, 1990. "Response to Markoff and Levi," Rationality and Society, , vol. 2(3), pages 386-390, July.
    2. Daniel Diermeier & Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2013. "Endogenous Property Rights," NBER Working Papers 19734, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Mariarosaria Agostino, 2004. "Conditionality, Commitment and Investment Response in LDCs," Economics Working Papers 2004-10, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.
    4. Jean Paul Azam & Robert Bates & Bruno Biais, 2009. "Political Predation And Economic Development," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(2), pages 255-277, July.
    5. Daniel Diermeier & Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2017. "Political Economy of Redistribution," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 85, pages 851-870, May.
    6. Mark Koyama, 2010. "The political economy of expulsion: the regulation of Jewish moneylending in medieval England," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 21(4), pages 374-406, December.
    7. Thomas Johnsen, 2011. "Supply network delegation and intervention strategies during supplier involvement in new product development," Post-Print hal-00771835, HAL.
    8. Ilia Murtazashvili & Ennio E. Piano, 2019. "Governance of shale gas development: Insights from the Bloomington school of institutional analysis," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 32(2), pages 159-179, June.
    9. Harris,Colin & Cai,Meina & Murtazashvili,Ilia & Murtazashvili,Jennifer Brick, 2020. "The Origins and Consequences of Property Rights," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781108969055.
    10. Hilton L. Root & Karen May, 2006. "Judicial Systems and Authoritarian Transitions," The Pakistan Development Review, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, vol. 45(4), pages 1301-1321.
    11. Noel D., Johnson & Mark, Koyama, 2012. "Standardizing the fiscal state: cabal tax farming as an Intermediate Institution in early-modern England and France," MPRA Paper 40403, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Kirsten Foss & Nicolai J. Foss & Xose H. Vazquez-Vicente, 2003. ""Tying the Manager's Hands": How Firms can make Credible Commitments that make Opportunistic Managerial Intervention Less Likely," DRUID Working Papers 03-10, DRUID, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Industrial Economics and Strategy/Aalborg University, Department of Business Studies.
    13. Edgar Kiser & Yoram Barzel, 1991. "The Origins of Democracy in England," Rationality and Society, , vol. 3(4), pages 396-422, October.

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