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Drivers and constraints of state confiscation of elite property in the Ottoman Empire, 1750-1839

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  • Arslantas, Yasin

Abstract

This paper examines the motives, timing and informal constraints of state confiscation in the Ottoman Empire, focusing on one of its most turbulent and confiscatory periods, 1750-1839. Utilizing a new dataset uncovered from confiscation inventories, I first demonstrate that confiscations were practiced on a selective basis, targeting some office-holders and tax farmers. Second, employing a two-step econometric framework inspired by the gradual nature of Ottoman confiscations, I argue that the initial decision whether to send an agent to confiscate one’s wealth was driven mainly by severity of war and expected costs of confiscation, while attributes of wealth and bargaining power of families vis-à-vis the central administration shaped the outcome of the second step.

Suggested Citation

  • Arslantas, Yasin, 2018. "Drivers and constraints of state confiscation of elite property in the Ottoman Empire, 1750-1839," Economic History Working Papers 88096, London School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Economic History.
    • Handle: RePEc:ehl:wpaper:88096
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    File URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/88096/
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Karaman, K. Kivanç & Pamuk, Şevket, 2013. "Different Paths to the Modern State in Europe: The Interaction Between Warfare, Economic Structure, and Political Regime," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 107(3), pages 603-626, August.
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    6. Veitch, John M., 1986. "Repudiations and Confiscations by the Medieval State," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 46(1), pages 31-36, March.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Ottoman Empire; Confiscation; State Predation; Institutions; State Capacity; Property Rights;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • N25 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - Asia including Middle East
    • P48 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies

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