The value of vengefulness: Reputational incentives for initiating versus reciprocating aggression
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DOI: 10.1177/1043463115576135
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- Piotr Mateusz Patrzyk & Martin TakáÄ, 2017. "Cooperation Via Intimidation: An Emergent System of Mutual Threats can Maintain Social Order," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 20(4), pages 1-5.
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Keywords
Aggression; cooperation; experiment; Hawk–Dove game; reputation; signaling;All these keywords.
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