IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/pubfin/v2y1974i3p313-321.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

An ‘Internality’ Case for Efficient Transfers

Author

Listed:
  • Jona Than Kesselman

    (University o' British Columbia)

Abstract

Previous efficiency arguments for redistribution have derived from an externality of some form. This paper investigates an ‘internality’ process–endogenous change of tastes by recipients of transfers–adapted from C. C. von Weizsäcker. Benevolent or paternalist preferences of donors do not enter the argument, unlike most previous theories. Taste change operates to alter the recipient's working behavior. His increased earnings make him no longer eligible for transfers. An income tax device or contingent loan repayment can be implemented to repay the original donors. Thus, Pareto superiority of the transfer may be established. Further consideration of information and enforcement costs suggests a case for collective action.

Suggested Citation

  • Jona Than Kesselman, 1974. "An ‘Internality’ Case for Efficient Transfers," Public Finance Review, , vol. 2(3), pages 313-321, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:2:y:1974:i:3:p:313-321
    DOI: 10.1177/109114217400200302
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/109114217400200302
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1177/109114217400200302?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bergstrom, Theodore C., 1970. "A "Scandinavian consensus" solution for efficient income distribution among nonmalevolent consumers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 383-398, December.
    2. Jonathan Kesselman, 1973. "Incentive Effects of Transfer Systems Once Again," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 8(1), pages 119-129.
    3. Kesselman, Jonathan R., 1973. "A comprehensive approach to income maintenance: swift," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 59-88, February.
    4. John Conlisk, 1968. "Simple Dynamic Effects in Work-Leisure Choice: A Skeptical Comment on the Static Theory," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 3(3), pages 324-326.
    5. Lawrence D. Schall, 1972. "Interdependent Utilities and Pareto Optimality," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 86(1), pages 19-24.
    6. von Weizsacker, Carl Christian, 1971. "Notes on endogenous change of tastes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 345-372, December.
    7. Mishan, E J, 1972. "The Futility of Pareto-Efficient Distributions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 971-976, December.
    8. Zeckhauser, Richard J, 1971. "Optimal Mechanisms for Income Transfer," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(3), pages 324-334, June.
    9. Hochman, Harold M & Rodgers, James D, 1969. "Pareto Optimal Redistribution," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(4), pages 542-557, Part I Se.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Christian Morrisson & Philippe Cazenave, 1973. "Fonctions d'utilité interdépendantes et théorie de la redistribution en économie de production," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 24(5), pages 725-760.
    2. Philippe Fontaine, 2007. "From Philanthropy to Altruism: Incorporating Unselfish Behavior into Economics, 1961-1975," History of Political Economy, Duke University Press, vol. 39(1), pages 1-46, Spring.
    3. John F. Johnston, 1975. "Utility Interdependence and Redistribution: Methodological Implications for Welfare Economics and the Theory of the Public Household," Public Finance Review, , vol. 3(3), pages 195-228, July.
    4. Casey Mulligan & Tomas Philipson, "undated". "Merit Motives and Government Intervention: Public Finance in Reverse," University of Chicago - Population Research Center 2000-03, Chicago - Population Research Center.
    5. Philippe Fontaine, 2000. "Making use of the past: theorists and historians on the economics of altruism," The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 7(3), pages 407-422.
    6. Paul Oslington, 2012. "General Equilibrium: Theory and Evidence," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 88(282), pages 446-448, September.
    7. Ythier, Jean Mercier, 1998. "The distribution of wealth in the liberal social contract," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 329-347, February.
    8. Christian Morrisson & Philippe Cazenave, 1974. "La redistribution des revenus en Grande-Bretagne, en France et aux Etats-Unis," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 25(4), pages 635-671.
    9. J. Giertz, 1982. "A limited defense of Pareto optimal redistribution," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 39(2), pages 277-282, January.
    10. Falkinger, Josef, 1999. "Social instability and redistribution of income," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 35-51, March.
    11. W D A Bryant, 2009. "General Equilibrium:Theory and Evidence," World Scientific Books, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., number 6875, August.
    12. Christian Morrisson & Philippe Cazenave, 1972. "Fonctions d'utilité interdépendantes et théorie de la redistribution en économie d'échange," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 23(2), pages 214-242.
    13. Bruce D. Fitzgerald, 1975. "Self-Interest or Altruism," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 19(3), pages 462-479, September.
    14. Jesse Malkin & Aaron Wildavsky, 1991. "Why the Traditional Distinction between Public and Private Goods Should be Abandoned," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 3(4), pages 355-378, October.
    15. Laaser, Claus-Friedrich & Rosenschon, Astrid, 2022. "Die Bundesausgaben in Zeiten von Corona im Fokus des Kieler Bundesausgabenmonitors: Eine Strukturanalyse," Kieler Beiträge zur Wirtschaftspolitik 41, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    16. Uri Ben-Zion & Uriel Spiegel, 1983. "Philanthropic motives and contribution policy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 40(2), pages 117-133, January.
    17. Shuanglin Lin, 2003. "The Effect of Public Transfers on Physical and Human Capital Accumulation," Public Finance Review, , vol. 31(6), pages 669-693, November.
    18. E. Pasour, 1981. "Pareto optimality as a guide to income redistribution," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 75-87, January.
    19. Jean Mercier Ythier, 1993. "Équilibre général de dons individuels," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 44(5), pages 925-950.
    20. Harold M. Hochman & James D. Rodgers, 1973. "Brennan and Walsh Reconsidered (Mutt and Jeff Ride Again)," Public Finance Review, , vol. 1(4), pages 359-371, October.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:2:y:1974:i:3:p:313-321. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.