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La redistribution des revenus en Grande-Bretagne, en France et aux Etats-Unis

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  • Christian Morrisson
  • Philippe Cazenave

Abstract

[fre] La redistribution des revenus aux Etats-Unis, en France et en Grande-Bretagne. . Cet article compare d'abord la redistribution observée dans ces trois pays selon les deux hypothèses, A (répartition uniforme des dépenses collectives) ou B (répartition de ces dépenses analogue à celle des revenus avant intervention). La redistribution diminue toujours C le taux de concentration des revenus, de 12 à 14 points dans l'hypothèse A ou de 5 à 10 points dans l'hypothèse B. La baisse maximale de C est atteinte dans le pays (la Grande-Bretagne) où la distribution avant intervention est la moins concentrée. La deuxième partie interprète la redistribution entre tranches de revenus en utilisant des modèles fondés sur l'hypothèse de transferts volontaires. D'après le critère de la somme pondérée des valeurs absolues des écarts, le modèle où le transfert de j à i est une fonction de (Yj— Yi)β s'avère le plus satisfaisant. Les différences entre redistribution théorique et redistribution observée sont significatives. En effet en Grande-Bretagne le premier décile reçoit plus que les valeurs indiquées par le modèle alors qu'en France et aux Etats-Unis il reçoit moins. Dans les trois pays, et notamment en France et aux Etats-Unis, les membres des 7e, 8e et 9e déciles bénéficient d'une situation privilégiée : le transfert négatif observé est inférieur au transfert théorique. La comparaison des transferts théoriques et observés permet d'interpréter ces derniers comme la résultante de transferts volontaires et de transferts forcés en situation d'incertitude. [eng] Income redistribution in U.S.A., France and Great Britain. . This paper first compares redistribution as seen in these 3 countries according to 2 hypothesis : A (uniform distribution of general expendif tires), B (similar distribution to that of primat y incomes). Redistribution always lessens R (concentration ratio whose limits are 0 and 100) from 12 to 14 points in the A hypothesis and from 5 to 10 points in the B hypothesis. The highest drop of R is to be found in Great Britain where distribution of primat y income (i.e. before redistribution) is less unequal. Secondly redistribution between income size is interpreted, using models based on the hypothesis of voluntary transfers. According to the criterium of the weighted sum of differences (absolute values) the model where transfer from j to i depends on (Yj — Yi)β appears as the most satisfactory. Differences between theoretical values and observed values are significant. For instance, in Great Britain, Ist decile receives more than theoretical values indicated by the model, wether as in France and U.S.A. it receives less. In all 3 countries, and above ail in France and U.S.A., persons belonging to the 7th, 8th, and 9th deciles enjoy a privileged position : the negative transfer observed is less than the theoretical value. As theoretical and observed transfers are compared, it is possible to consider the latter as resulting both from voluntary and compulsory transfers undet uncertainty.

Suggested Citation

  • Christian Morrisson & Philippe Cazenave, 1974. "La redistribution des revenus en Grande-Bretagne, en France et aux Etats-Unis," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 25(4), pages 635-671.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1974_num_25_4_408166
    DOI: 10.3406/reco.1974.408166
    Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.1974.408166
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bergstrom, Theodore C., 1970. "A "Scandinavian consensus" solution for efficient income distribution among nonmalevolent consumers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 383-398, December.
    2. Hochman, Harold M & Rodgers, James D, 1969. "Pareto Optimal Redistribution," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(4), pages 542-557, Part I Se.
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    1. Pommerehne, Werner W., 1976. "Quantitative aspects of federalism: A study of six countries," Discussion Papers, Series I 74, University of Konstanz, Department of Economics.
    2. François Lagarde & Guy Worms, 1978. "La redistribution : une problématique nouvelle," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 32(1), pages 54-74.

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