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Fonctions d'utilité interdépendantes et théorie de la redistribution en économie de production

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  • Christian Morrisson
  • Philippe Cazenave

Abstract

[fre] Fonctions d'utilité interdependantes et théorie de la redistribution en économie de production. . Les résultats établis à propos d'une économie d'échange (Revue économique, n° 3, mai 1972) peuvent se généraliser à une économie de production. Le niveau de production est en général différent de celui qui s'établirait en l'absence de trans­ferts. La décision optimale de certains bénéficiaires peut être de cesser de travailler. L'interprétation des variations des transferts volontaires est approfondie en raison de confusions commises par Hochman et Rodgers. La notion de transferts forcés est définie. Elle permet d'analyser d'une part la « réaction de production » de l'individu contraint à transférer plus qu'il ne voudrait, d'autre part la révolte du pauvre contre le riche ou, pour n individus, la formation de coalitions révolution-naires à partir de la théorie des choix rationnels. [eng] Interdependent utility functions and redistribution theory in a production economy. . The results of the analysis of an exchange economy can be generalized to a production economy. In general, the level of production is different from the level which prevails without transfers. Some beneficiames may choose optimally not to work. The variations of voluntary transfers are re-interpreted to avoid the confusions of the Hochman-Rodgers paper. The notion of compulsory transfers is defined. It makes possible to analyse, on one hand, the « production reaction » of the individual forced to transfer more than he would, on the other hand the revolt of the poor against the rich or, for n individuals, the existence of revolutionary coalitions, along the lines of the rational choices theory.

Suggested Citation

  • Christian Morrisson & Philippe Cazenave, 1973. "Fonctions d'utilité interdépendantes et théorie de la redistribution en économie de production," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 24(5), pages 725-760.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1973_num_24_5_408110
    DOI: 10.3406/reco.1973.408110
    Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.1973.408110
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gordon Tullock, 1971. "The paradox of revolution," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 89-99, September.
    2. repec:bla:kyklos:v:24:y:1971:i:4:p:629-43 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Lawrence D. Schall, 1972. "Interdependent Utilities and Pareto Optimality," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 86(1), pages 19-24.
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    6. Gordon Tullock, 1971. "The Cost Of Transfers," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(4), pages 629-643, November.
    7. Mishan, E J, 1972. "The Futility of Pareto-Efficient Distributions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 971-976, December.
    8. Zeckhauser, Richard J, 1971. "Optimal Mechanisms for Income Transfer," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(3), pages 324-334, June.
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