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Micro-Based Examination of the Demand for Income-Redistribution Benefits

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  • Thomas A. Husted

    (American University)

Abstract

This article examines the possibility that two factors simultaneously motivate nonrecipient demand for income redistribution. The empirical analysis indicates that support for food stamp program benefits can be explained within a public good framework, while Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) benefits are desired as personal insurance against randomness in income as well as for the public good characteristics of the program. The presence of more than one motivation helps to explain the many differences in income-redistribution programs currently found in the United States.

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas A. Husted, 1990. "Micro-Based Examination of the Demand for Income-Redistribution Benefits," Public Finance Review, , vol. 18(2), pages 157-181, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:18:y:1990:i:2:p:157-181
    DOI: 10.1177/109114219001800202
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    Cited by:

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    2. Judy A. Temple & Susan Porter‐Hudak, 1995. "Preferences For State Tax And Spending Policies: Evidence From Survey Data On The Role Of Income," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(1), pages 43-58, March.
    3. Himayatullah Khan, 2009. "Willingness to pay and demand elasticities for two national parks: empirical evidence from two surveys in Pakistan," Environment, Development and Sustainability: A Multidisciplinary Approach to the Theory and Practice of Sustainable Development, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 293-305, April.

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