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Contrasting tactical and strategic dynamics on a Clausewitz landscape

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  • Rodrick Wallace

Abstract

Statistical models based on the asymptotic limit theorems of control and information theories allow formal examination of the essential differences between short-time “tactical†confrontations and a long-term “strategic†conflict dominated by evolutionary process. The world of extended coevolutionary conflict is not the world of sequential “muddling through.†The existential strategic challenge is to take cognitive control of a long-term dynamic in which one may, in fact, be “losing†most short-term confrontations. Winning individual battles can be a relatively direct, if not simple or easy, matter of sufficient local resources, training, and resolve. Winning extended conflicts is not direct, and requires management of subtle coevolutionary phenomena subject to a dismaying punctuated equilibrium more familiar from evolutionary theory than military doctrine. Directed evolution has given us the agricultural base needed for large-scale human organization. Directed coevolution of the inevitable conflicts between the various segments of that organization may be needed for its long-term persistence.

Suggested Citation

  • Rodrick Wallace, 2020. "Contrasting tactical and strategic dynamics on a Clausewitz landscape," The Journal of Defense Modeling and Simulation, , vol. 17(2), pages 143-153, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:joudef:v:17:y:2020:i:2:p:143-153
    DOI: 10.1177/1548512919848068
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bahar Leventoğlu & Branislav L. Slantchev, 2007. "The Armed Peace: A Punctuated Equilibrium Theory of War," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 51(4), pages 755-771, October.
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