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From war to peace: Understanding the end of the armed conflict in Colombia

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  • Jerónimo Ríos

Abstract

The following article uses a simple-game theoretic model to explain the termination of the Colombian-armed conflict. Assuming a rationality of the Colombian Government and the guerrilla group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces, People’s Army within the internal armed conflict, an analysis of conjuncture and an identification of dimensions and strategies are used to try to explain the evolution of the armed conflict in the last two decades and its particular transformation. This is done by comparing the frustrated Caguán process, which took place between 1999 and 2002, with the recently completed Havana process that has put an end to more than five decades of internal conflict.

Suggested Citation

  • Jerónimo Ríos, 2018. "From war to peace: Understanding the end of the armed conflict in Colombia," Rationality and Society, , vol. 30(4), pages 463-490, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:30:y:2018:i:4:p:463-490
    DOI: 10.1177/1043463118759672
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    References listed on IDEAS

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