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Centers of gravity and war outcomes

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  • Stephen L. Quackenbush

Abstract

Bargaining models argue that wars usually terminate when the information gap closes enough to create a bargaining range. Although this convergence is assumed to be straightforward, factors that identify the information regarding the likely military outcome to the belligerents have not been identified. One of Clausewitz’s main ideas was that states can win wars by attacking the enemy’s centers of gravity, which I argue provide an important way through which information convergence is achieved. I examine the importance of three centers of gravity—capturing the enemy’s capital, destroying the enemy’s military forces, and eliminating enemy allies from the war—on war outcomes through a quantitative analysis of wars from 1816 to 2007.

Suggested Citation

  • Stephen L. Quackenbush, 2016. "Centers of gravity and war outcomes," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 33(4), pages 361-380, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:compsc:v:33:y:2016:i:4:p:361-380
    DOI: 10.1177/0738894215570430
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    References listed on IDEAS

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