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Rational erraticism

Author

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  • Frank Bohn

    (Department of Economics, Institute for Management Research, Radboud University, Nijmegen, the Netherlands, 6525 AJ Nijmegen
    KOF Swiss Economic Institute, Zurich, Switzerland)

  • Xue Wang

    (School of Economics, 12603Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, Chengdu, China)

Abstract

Trump and Bolsonaro are perceived as erratic presidents, but they may actually be quite rational. We explore two channels of manipulation in a polarized society. One relates to swing voters and their perception of a president’s competence. The other one captures the effort by a president to appeal and mobilize her base voters. We model erraticism in dealing with the COVID-19 pandemic, but our model could also be applied to other realms of political manipulation. We find that erratic freedom propaganda directed against state-administered lockdowns may help a president in her re-election bid. Paradoxically, if the challenger gains popular support or increases voter mobilization against the president, it is optimal for the president to further increase erratic propaganda in order to increase the mobilization of her own supporters. Our predicted surge in voter mobilization is actually a main outcome of the 2020 US elections.

Suggested Citation

  • Frank Bohn & Xue Wang, 2022. "Rational erraticism," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 34(2), pages 219-235, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:34:y:2022:i:2:p:219-235
    DOI: 10.1177/09516298221081807
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    References listed on IDEAS

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