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The effects of fiscal policy management, candidacy of previous mayors, and illiteracy on mayoral reelection in Brazil

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  • Jonatan Lautenschlage
  • Linda G. Veiga
  • Francisco J. Veiga

Abstract

This study investigates factors influencing the reelection prospects of Brazilian mayors. Analyzing a comprehensive data set spanning 5114 municipalities across four elections reveals that increases in investment and current expenditures before elections pay off at the polls. Moreover, higher average investment expenditures throughout the term enhance reelection chances. The results also indicate that when former term‐limited mayors run against the incumbent, reelection probability diminishes, particularly with higher average investment by the previous mayor. Finally, the level of literacy shapes voter attitudes towards opportunistic fiscal strategies: voters with limited literacy are inclined to reward increases in current expenditures, whereas more educated populations prefer increasing investment.

Suggested Citation

  • Jonatan Lautenschlage & Linda G. Veiga & Francisco J. Veiga, 2024. "The effects of fiscal policy management, candidacy of previous mayors, and illiteracy on mayoral reelection in Brazil," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(3), pages 1345-1381, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:36:y:2024:i:3:p:1345-1381
    DOI: 10.1111/ecpo.12290
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