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Why Underachievers Dominate Secret Police Organizations: Evidence from Autocratic Argentina

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  • Adam Scharpf
  • Christian Gläßel

Abstract

Autocrats depend on a capable secret police. Anecdotal evidence, however, often characterizes agents as surprisingly mediocre in skill and intellect. To explain this puzzle, this article focuses on the career incentives underachieving individuals face in the regular security apparatus. Low‐performing officials in hierarchical organizations have little chance of being promoted or filling lucrative positions. To salvage their careers, these officials are willing to undertake burdensome secret police work. Using data on all 4,287 officers who served in autocratic Argentina (1975–83), we study biographic differences between secret police agents and the entire recruitment pool. We find that low‐achieving officers were stuck within the regime hierarchy, threatened with discharge, and thus more likely to join the secret police for future benefits. The study demonstrates how state bureaucracies breed mundane career concerns that produce willing enforcers and cement violent regimes. This has implications for the understanding of autocratic consolidation and democratic breakdown.

Suggested Citation

  • Adam Scharpf & Christian Gläßel, 2020. "Why Underachievers Dominate Secret Police Organizations: Evidence from Autocratic Argentina," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 64(4), pages 791-806, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:64:y:2020:i:4:p:791-806
    DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12475
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Sebastián Einstoss, 2024. "“Todo está guardado en la memoria”: The Aftermath of State Violence in Argentina," Young Researchers Working Papers 14, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, revised Jul 2024.
    2. Einstoss Sebastian, 2023. "Todo está guardado en la memoria: el efecto de la violencia de estado en Argentina (Versión preliminar)," Asociación Argentina de Economía Política: Working Papers 4648, Asociación Argentina de Economía Política.

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