IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/jothpo/v29y2017i3p382-414.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Tariff politics and congressional elections: exploring the Cannon Thesis

Author

Listed:
  • Andrew J Clarke

    (University of Virginia, USA)

  • Jeffery A Jenkins

    (University of Virginia, USA)

  • Kenneth S Lowande

    (Washington University in St. Louis, USA)

Abstract

While a number of studies have examined the politics of tariff decision-making in the United States, little work has examined the subsequent political effects of tariff policy. We help fill this gap in the literature by analyzing—both theoretically and empirically—the electoral implications of tariff revision. Specifically, we investigate the veracity of the Cannon Thesis—the proposition advanced by Speaker Joe Cannon in 1910 that the majority party in the U.S. House was punished when it made major revisions to the tariff. We find that from 1877 to 1934 major tariff revisions were, on average, associated with a significant loss of votes for majority-party members—both regionally and nationally—that translated into a loss of House seats. We find support for the notion that major tariff revisions generated inordinate uncertainty among various business interests, which the opposition party could then use (by leveraging fear and market instability) to mobilize its base and gain ground in the following election. Our results provide a new explanation for the delegation of tariff policymaking to the executive branch.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrew J Clarke & Jeffery A Jenkins & Kenneth S Lowande, 2017. "Tariff politics and congressional elections: exploring the Cannon Thesis," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 29(3), pages 382-414, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:29:y:2017:i:3:p:382-414
    DOI: 10.1177/0951629816647801
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0951629816647801
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1177/0951629816647801?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hansen, John Mark, 1990. "Taxation and the political economy of the tariff," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 44(4), pages 527-551, October.
    2. Douglass C. North, 1990. "A Transaction Cost Theory of Politics," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 2(4), pages 355-367, October.
    3. David Brady & Judith Goldstein, 2002. "Does Party Matter? An Historical Test Using Senate Tariff Votes in Three Institutional Settings," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 18(1), pages 140-154, April.
    4. Fordham, Benjamin O. & McKeown, Timothy J., 2003. "Selection and Influence: Interest Groups and Congressional Voting on Trade Policy," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 57(3), pages 519-549, July.
    5. Anthony J. Madonna, 2011. "Winning Coalition Formation in the U.S. Senate: The Effects of Legislative Decision Rules and Agenda Change," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 55(2), pages 276-288, April.
    6. Brandon R. Dupont, 2009. "Panic in the plains: agricultural markets and the panic of 1893," Cliometrica, Journal of Historical Economics and Econometric History, Association Française de Cliométrie (AFC), vol. 3(1), pages 27-54, January.
    7. Nicholas Weller, 2009. "Trading policy: Constituents and party in U.S. trade policy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 141(1), pages 87-101, October.
    8. Sean Gailmard & John W. Patty, 2007. "Slackers and Zealots: Civil Service, Policy Discretion, and Bureaucratic Expertise," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 51(4), pages 873-889, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Timini, Jacopo, 2020. "Staying dry on Spanish wine: The rejection of the 1905 Spanish-Italian trade agreement," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    2. J. Brian O’Roark, 2012. "Economists in Congress: How Economic Education Motivates Votes on Free Trade in Congress," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 27(Spring 20), pages 83-101.
    3. Dietrichson, Jens, 2013. "Coordination Incentives, Performance Measurement and Resource Allocation in Public Sector Organizations," Working Papers 2013:26, Lund University, Department of Economics.
    4. Douglass C. North, 2016. "Institutions and Economic Theory," The American Economist, Sage Publications, vol. 61(1), pages 72-76, March.
    5. Kono Daniel Y., 2011. "Insuring Free Trade: Unemployment Insurance and Trade Policy," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 13(3), pages 1-31, October.
    6. Joachim Ahrens & Patrick Jünemann, 2011. "Adaptive Efficiency and Pragmatic Flexibility: Characteristics of Institutional Change in Capitalism, Chinese-style," Chapters, in: Werner Pascha & Cornelia Storz & Markus Taube (ed.), Institutional Variety in East Asia, chapter 2, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    7. Krammer, Sorin M.S., 2022. "Human resource policies and firm innovation: The moderating effects of economic and institutional context," Technovation, Elsevier, vol. 110(C).
    8. Tinghua Yu, 2021. "Intrinsic Motivation, Office Incentives, and Innovation," BCAM Working Papers 2106, Birkbeck Centre for Applied Macroeconomics.
    9. Tao, Qizhi & Li, Haoyu & Wu, Qun & Zhang, Ting & Zhu, Yingjun, 2019. "The dark side of board network centrality: Evidence from merger performance," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 215-232.
    10. López-Sáez, Pedro & Cruz-González, Jorge & Navas-López, Jose Emilio & Perona-Alfageme, María del Mar, 2021. "Organizational integration mechanisms and knowledge transfer effectiveness in MNCs: The moderating role of cross-national distance," Journal of International Management, Elsevier, vol. 27(4).
    11. Richard E. Baldwin & Frédéric Robert-Nicoud, 2007. "Entry and Asymmetric Lobbying: Why Governments Pick Losers," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 5(5), pages 1064-1093, September.
    12. Claude Ménard, 2013. "Is Public-Private Partnership Obsolete? Assessing the Obstacles and Shortcomings of PPP," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00653090, HAL.
    13. Carolyn Kousky, 2014. "Managing shoreline retreat: a US perspective," Climatic Change, Springer, vol. 124(1), pages 9-20, May.
    14. Thomas Quinn, 2005. "Leasehold or Freehold? Leader‐Eviction Rules in the British Conservative and Labour Parties," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 53(4), pages 793-815, December.
    15. Fernando Filgueiras & Pedro Palotti & Graziella G. Testa, 2023. "Complexing Governance Styles: Connecting Politics and Policy in Governance Theories," SAGE Open, , vol. 13(1), pages 21582440231, March.
    16. James Lake & Maia Linask, 2016. "Domestic political competition and pro-cyclical import protection," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(3), pages 564-591, August.
    17. Lake, James & Linask, Maia K., 2016. "Could tariffs be pro-cyclical?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 124-146.
    18. Eric Ip, 2014. "The judicial review of legislation in the United Kingdom: a public choice analysis," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 221-247, April.
    19. Mehrdad Vahabi, 2011. "Appropriation, violent enforcement, and transaction costs: a critical survey," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 147(1), pages 227-253, April.
    20. Rohe, Sebastian & Oltmer, Marie & Wolter, Hendrik & Gmeiner, Nina & Tschersich , Julia, 2022. "Forever Niche: Why do organic vegetable varieties not diffuse?," Papers in Innovation Studies 2022/8, Lund University, CIRCLE - Centre for Innovation Research.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:29:y:2017:i:3:p:382-414. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.