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Selection and Influence: Interest Groups and Congressional Voting on Trade Policy

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  • Fordham, Benjamin O.
  • McKeown, Timothy J.

Abstract

Studies of the effects of interest groups on congressional roll-call voting typically view party and ideology as competing factors and rely on a factoral model of interests or a sectoral model including only interest groups with a direct stake in the vote. We depart from that strategy in several ways. We define interest groups at the level of Standard Industrial Classification two-digit codes and observe the universe of interests. For 1979–90, we use measures of geographically and nongeographically based economic interests to estimate the representative's party and ideology. We also consider the factor endowments of individuals within a district to examine their impact on floor votes. We then investigate the influence of these interests on members' party affiliation and ideology, as well as a pool of five floor votes on foreign trade, using instrumental variables for party and ideology. Economic interests account for a substantial portion of the variance in all cases, and models that also include other explanatory variables are highly accurate in estimating floor votes.

Suggested Citation

  • Fordham, Benjamin O. & McKeown, Timothy J., 2003. "Selection and Influence: Interest Groups and Congressional Voting on Trade Policy," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 57(3), pages 519-549, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:intorg:v:57:y:2003:i:03:p:519-549_57
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    Cited by:

    1. David Autor & David Dorn & Gordon Hanson & Kaveh Majlesi, 2020. "Importing Political Polarization? The Electoral Consequences of Rising Trade Exposure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 110(10), pages 3139-3183, October.
    2. Stephanie J. Rickard, 2015. "Compensating the Losers: An Examination of Congressional Votes on Trade Adjustment Assistance," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 41(1), pages 46-60, January.
    3. Pinheiro, Diogo & Chwieroth, Jeffrey & Hicks, Alexander, 2015. "Do international non-governmental organizations inhibit globalization? the case of capital account liberalization in developing countries," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 63669, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    4. Wolfe, Robert, 2007. "Harvesting Public Policy? Private Influence on Agricultural Trade Policy in Canada," Working Papers 7339, Canadian Agricultural Trade Policy Research Network.
    5. Andreas Dür, 2008. "Measuring Interest Group Influence in the EU," European Union Politics, , vol. 9(4), pages 559-576, December.
    6. J. Broz, 2011. "The United States Congress and IMF financing, 1944–2009," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 341-368, September.
    7. Celik, Levent & Karabay, Bilgehan & McLaren, John, 2013. "Trade policy-making in a model of legislative bargaining," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(2), pages 179-190.
    8. Katja B. Kleinberg & Benjamin O. Fordham, 2010. "Trade and Foreign Policy Attitudes," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 54(5), pages 687-714, October.
    9. Rickard, Stephanie J., 2015. "Compensating the losers: an examination of Congressional votes on trade adjustment assistance," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 88051, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    10. M. Rodwan Abouharb & Benjamin O. Fordham, 2020. "Trade and Strike Activity in the Postwar United States," Social Sciences, MDPI, vol. 9(11), pages 1-25, October.
    11. Kono Daniel Y., 2011. "Insuring Free Trade: Unemployment Insurance and Trade Policy," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 13(3), pages 1-31, October.
    12. Andrew J Clarke & Jeffery A Jenkins & Kenneth S Lowande, 2017. "Tariff politics and congressional elections: exploring the Cannon Thesis," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 29(3), pages 382-414, July.
    13. J. Brian O’Roark, 2012. "Economists in Congress: How Economic Education Motivates Votes on Free Trade in Congress," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 27(Spring 20), pages 83-101.
    14. Timini, Jacopo, 2020. "Staying dry on Spanish wine: The rejection of the 1905 Spanish-Italian trade agreement," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).

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