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Winning Coalition Formation in the U.S. Senate: The Effects of Legislative Decision Rules and Agenda Change

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  • Anthony J. Madonna

Abstract

Recent empirical work has brought a renewed attention to the effect congressional rules of procedure have on the size of winning coalitions. Specifically, scholars have posited that legislative success hinges on the support of legislators identified by institutionally defined decision rules. Under these theories, supermajority decision rules in the U.S. Senate lead to larger, more inclusive coalitions on final passage. In this article, I reevaluate these claims by controlling for changes in the legislative agenda and the roll‐call voting record. I find that the aggregate size of winning coalitions is highly responsive to the underlying legislative agenda, the size of the Senate's majority party, and the manner in which researchers treat unrecorded votes. Further, my findings suggest that any connection between changes in the Senate's voting rules and the size of winning coalitions is spurious. Eric Schickler and Gregory J. Wawro have authored a response to this article, and Anthony J. Madonna has authored a rejoinder to this response. Both are available as Supporting Information.

Suggested Citation

  • Anthony J. Madonna, 2011. "Winning Coalition Formation in the U.S. Senate: The Effects of Legislative Decision Rules and Agenda Change," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 55(2), pages 276-288, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:55:y:2011:i:2:p:276-288
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00491.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Andrew J Clarke & Jeffery A Jenkins & Kenneth S Lowande, 2017. "Tariff politics and congressional elections: exploring the Cannon Thesis," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 29(3), pages 382-414, July.
    2. Sarah Binder, 2020. "How we (should?) study Congress and history," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 185(3), pages 415-427, December.
    3. Michael H. Crespin & Anthony Madonna & Joel Sievert & Nathaniel Ament-Stone, 2015. "The Establishment of Party Policy Committees in the U.S. Senate: Coordination, Not Coercion," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 96(1), pages 34-48, March.

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