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A Simple Model of Legislator and News Media Interaction

Author

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  • Brian J. Fogarty

    (Department of Political Science, University of Missouri-St. Louis, St. Louis MO 63121, USA, fogartyb@umsl.edu)

Abstract

This article examines the effect of a strategic news media on legislators' interactions with their constituencies. Specifically, legislators can only be constrained by constituency preferences over policies when voters have the information to hold legislators accountable for their actions. A strategic news media can provide such information in a constant and continuous manner unlike, say, challengers. This article addresses this scenario with several models. First, a signaling model is introduced with constituency preferences and a journalist's investigating and reporting strategies serving as constraints on a legislator's voting preferences. Results of the baseline model include a pooling equilibrium where legislators vote with the district and are always re-elected. Second, a basic ultimatum bargaining model is introduced to allow for collusion between journalists and legislators in the output of the news product. This extension highlights a pure strategy-separating equilibrium where an out-of-step legislator is able to secure silence from the journalist and win re-election. Finally, the role of multiple journalists covering a legislator is considered. Results illustrate that as the number of media outlets increases within a district, the quality of representation also increases.

Suggested Citation

  • Brian J. Fogarty, 2009. "A Simple Model of Legislator and News Media Interaction," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 21(1), pages 5-24, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:21:y:2009:i:1:p:5-24
    DOI: 10.1177/0951629808097282
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Matthew Gentzkow & Jesse M. Shapiro, 2006. "Media Bias and Reputation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(2), pages 280-316, April.
    2. Timothy Besley & Andrea Prat, 2006. "Handcuffs for the Grabbing Hand? Media Capture and Government Accountability," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 720-736, June.
    3. Bovitz, Gregory L & Druckman, James N & Lupia, Arthur, 2002. "When Can a News Organization Lead Public Opinion? Ideology versus Market Forces in Decisions to Make News," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 113(1-2), pages 127-155, October.
    4. Baron, David P., 2006. "Persistent media bias," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(1-2), pages 1-36, January.
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