IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/jothpo/v20y2008i3p329-338.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Bribery and Favoritism in Queuing Models of Rationed Resource Allocation

Author

Listed:
  • Amitrajeet A. Batabyal

    (Rochester Institute of Technology, aabgsh@rit.edu)

  • Hamid Beladi

    (University of Texas in San Antonio, Hamid.Beladi@utsa.edu)

Abstract

Queuing mechanisms are commonly used in developing countries and in transition economies to allocate goods characterized by excess demand to citizens. Bribery and favoritism frequently accompany the use of such queuing mechanisms. Therefore, we first analyze a queuing model of resource allocation with bribery. Specifically, we determine the expected wait time of a citizen from the time he arrives to queue and the time he obtains the rationed good, the likelihood that a citizen illegally obtains n units of the rationed good, and the expected time a citizen spends being served by the public or private official. Next, we analyze a queuing model of resource allocation with favoritism. Using this model, we ascertain the mean arrival rate of the favored citizen and the likelihood that an ordinary citizen is bumped n times to provide the rationed good immediately to the favored citizen.

Suggested Citation

  • Amitrajeet A. Batabyal & Hamid Beladi, 2008. "Bribery and Favoritism in Queuing Models of Rationed Resource Allocation," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 20(3), pages 329-338, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:20:y:2008:i:3:p:329-338
    DOI: 10.1177/0951629808090138
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0951629808090138
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1177/0951629808090138?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Geof Wood, 1999. "Private Provision after Public Neglect: Bending Irrigation Markets in North Bihar," Development and Change, International Institute of Social Studies, vol. 30(4), pages 775-794, October.
    2. Bennett, John, 1991. "Repressed inflation, queuing and the resale of goods in a centrally planned economy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 49-60, January.
    3. Praveen Kulshreshtha, 2003. "Rationing by Waiting, Opportunity Costs of Waiting and Bribery," Indian Economic Review, Department of Economics, Delhi School of Economics, vol. 38(1), pages 59-75, January.
    4. Maxim Boycko, 1992. "When Higher Incomes Reduce Welfare: Queues, Labor Supply, and Macro Equilibrium in Socialist Economies," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 107(3), pages 907-920.
    5. Amitrajeet Batabyal, 2005. "On bribing and balking in a simple queuing model of resource allocation," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 16(1), pages 1-10.
    6. Amitrajeet Batabyal & Peter Nijkamp, 2004. "Favoritism in the Public Provision of Goods in Developing Countries," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 15(1), pages 1-10.
    7. Kulshreshtha, Praveen, 2007. "An efficiency and welfare classification of rationing by waiting in the presence of bribery," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 530-548, July.
    8. von Furstenberg, George M & Spangenberg, Nicholas O, 1996. "The Political Temptations of Rationing by Insiders," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 88(1-2), pages 69-81, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Quoc-Anh Do & Kieu-Trang Nguyen & Anh N. Tran, 2017. "One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(4), pages 1-29, October.
    2. Quoc-Anh Do & Kieu-Trang Nguyen & Anh N. Tran, 2017. "One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(4), pages 1-29, October.
    3. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/6ggbvnr6munghes9ocpp7f52o is not listed on IDEAS
    4. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/6ggbvnr6munghes9ocpp7f52o is not listed on IDEAS
    5. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/6ggbvnr6munghes9ocpp7f52o is not listed on IDEAS
    6. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/6ggbvnr6munghes9ocpp7f52o is not listed on IDEAS

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:15:y:2005:i:14:p:1-7 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Amitrajeet Batabyal, 2005. "On the allocation of commodities by queuing and the prevention of violence," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 15(14), pages 1-7.
    3. Amitrajeet A. Batabyal & Seung Jick Yoo, 2007. "Corruption, Bribery, and Wait Times in the Public Allocation of Goods in Developing Countries," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(3), pages 507-517, August.
    4. Alexeev, Michael & Sabyr, Lyaziza, 2004. "Black markets and pre-reform crises in former socialist economies," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 1-12, March.
    5. Kulshreshtha, Praveen, 2007. "An efficiency and welfare classification of rationing by waiting in the presence of bribery," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 530-548, July.
    6. Debra Moore Patterson, 1996. "Reform in Eastern Europe: A General Equilibrium Model with Distortions in Relative Prices and Factor Markets," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 29(2), pages 457-472, May.
    7. Amitrajeet Batabyal, 2005. "On bribing and balking in a simple queuing model of resource allocation," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 16(1), pages 1-10.
    8. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:16:y:2005:i:1:p:1-10 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Erwin Nijsse & Elmer Sterken,, 1996. "Shortages, interest rates, and money demand in Poland, 1969-1995," Working Papers 25, Centre for Economic Research, University of Groningen and University of Twente.
    10. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:15:y:2004:i:1:p:1-10 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Berkowitz, Daniel & DeJong, David N., 2002. "Accounting for growth in post-Soviet Russia," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 221-239, March.
    12. Berkowitz, Daniel, 1996. "On the persistence of rationing following liberalization: A theory for economies in transition," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(6), pages 1259-1279, June.
    13. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/50oojv2kpq972a1928dqj0v6at is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Amitrajeet Batabyal & Peter Nijkamp, 2004. "Favoritism in the Public Provision of Goods in Developing Countries," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 15(1), pages 1-10.
    15. Amitrajeet Batabyal & Seung Jick Yoo, 2006. "A complete characterization of mean wait times for citizens in the non-preemptive corruption regime," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 13(12), pages 759-762.
    16. Alexeev, Michael & Leitzel, James, 2001. "Income distribution and price controls: Targeting a social safety net during economic transition," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(9), pages 1647-1663, October.
    17. Cecilia Testa, 2005. "Reforms, lobbies and welfare: A common agency approach," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 125(3), pages 305-337, December.
    18. Sergei Guriev, 2019. "Gorbachev versus Deng: A Review of Chris Miller's The Struggle to Save the Soviet Economy," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 57(1), pages 120-146, March.
    19. Huizinga, Harry, 1995. "The political economy of price ceilings for necessities," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 443-454, August.
    20. Kolomak Evgeniya, 2004. "How high are the barriers of the regional price regulation in Russia?," EERC Working Paper Series 04-11e, EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS.
    21. Joël CARIOLLE, 2016. "The voracity and scarcity effects of export booms and busts on bribery," Working Papers P146, FERDI.
    22. Amadou Amadou Boly & Kole Keita & Assi Okara & Guei Guei C. Okou, 2021. "Effect of corruption on educational quantity and quality : theory and evidence," Working Papers hal-03194726, HAL.
    23. Sergei Guriev, 2019. "Gorbachev versus Deng: A Review of Chris Miller's The Struggle to Save the Soviet Economy," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 57(1), pages 120-146, March.
    24. da Rocha, Bruno T., 2015. "Let the markets begin: The interplay between free prices and privatisation in early transition," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 350-370.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:20:y:2008:i:3:p:329-338. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.