Bribery and Favoritism in Queuing Models of Rationed Resource Allocation
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DOI: 10.1177/0951629808090138
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References listed on IDEAS
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"Favoritism in the Public Provision of Goods in Developing Countries,"
Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 15(1), pages 1-10.
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Cited by:
- Quoc-Anh Do & Kieu-Trang Nguyen & Anh N. Tran, 2017.
"One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime,"
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(4), pages 1-29, October.
- Quoc-Anh Do & Kieu-Trang Nguyen & Anh Tran, 2013. "One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03460977, HAL.
- Quoc-Anh Do & Kieu-Trang Nguyen & Anh Tran, 2017. "One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime," Post-Print hal-03391952, HAL.
- Do, Quoc-Anh & Nguyen, Kieu-Trang & Roiser, Anh N. Tran & Tran, Anh N., 2016. "One mandarin benefits the whole clan: hometown favoritism in an authoritarian regime," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 66422, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Quoc-Anh Do & Kieu-Trang Nguyen & Anh N. Tran, 2016. "One Mandarin benefits the whole clan: hometown favoritism in an authoritarian regime," CEP Discussion Papers dp1409, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- Quoc-Anh Do & Kieu-Trang Nguyen & Anh Tran, 2013. "One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime," Working Papers hal-03470572, HAL.
- Quoc-Anh Do & Kieu-Trang Nguyen & Anh Tran, 2013. "One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime," Working Papers hal-03460977, HAL.
- Quoc-Anh Do & Kieu-Trang Nguyen & Anh Tran, 2013. "One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03470572, HAL.
- Quoc-Anh Do & Kieu-Trang Nguyen & Anh Tran, 2017. "One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03391952, HAL.
- Do, Quoc-Anh & Nguyen, Kieu-Trang & Tran, Anh N., 2017. "One Mandarin benefits the whole clan: hometown favoritism in an authoritarian regime," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 85928, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/6ggbvnr6munghes9ocpp7f52o is not listed on IDEAS
- repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/6ggbvnr6munghes9ocpp7f52o is not listed on IDEAS
- repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/6ggbvnr6munghes9ocpp7f52o is not listed on IDEAS
- Quoc-Anh Do & Kieu-Trang Nguyen & Anh N. Tran, 2017.
"One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime,"
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(4), pages 1-29, October.
- Quoc-Anh Do & Kieu-Trang Nguyen & Anh Tran, 2013. "One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/2ck6as9uec9, Sciences Po.
- Do, Quoc-Anh & Nguyen, Kieu-Trang & Tran, Anh, 2016. "One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime," CEPR Discussion Papers 11126, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Quoc-Anh Do & Kieu-Trang Nguyen & Anh Tran, 2017. "One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime," Post-Print hal-03391952, HAL.
- Quoc-Anh Do & Kieu-Trang Nguyen & Anh Tran, 2013. "One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime," SciencePo Working papers hal-03460977, HAL.
- Quoc-Anh Do & Kieu-Trang Nguyen & Anh Tran, 2013. "One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime," Working Papers hal-03470572, HAL.
- Do, Quoc-Anh & Nguyen, Kieu-Trang & Roiser, Anh N. Tran & Tran, Anh N., 2016. "One mandarin benefits the whole clan: hometown favoritism in an authoritarian regime," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 66422, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Quoc-Anh Do & Kieu-Trang Nguyen & Anh N. Tran, 2016. "One Mandarin benefits the whole clan: hometown favoritism in an authoritarian regime," CEP Discussion Papers dp1409, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- Quoc-Anh Do & Kieu-Trang Nguyen & Anh Tran, 2017. "One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/sj22pruud8a, Sciences Po.
- Quoc-Anh Do & Kieu-Trang Nguyen & Anh Tran, 2017. "One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime," SciencePo Working papers hal-03391952, HAL.
- Quoc-Anh Do & Kieu-Trang Nguyen & Anh Tran, 2013. "One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime," SciencePo Working papers hal-03470572, HAL.
- Quoc-Anh Do & Kieu-Trang Nguyen & Anh Tran, 2013. "One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime," Working Papers hal-03460977, HAL.
- Quoc-Anh Do & Kieu-Trang Nguyen & Anh Tran, 2013. "One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime," Sciences Po publications 13, Sciences Po.
- Do, Quoc-Anh & Nguyen, Kieu-Trang & Tran, Anh N., 2017. "One Mandarin benefits the whole clan: hometown favoritism in an authoritarian regime," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 85928, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/6ggbvnr6munghes9ocpp7f52o is not listed on IDEAS
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Keywords
bribery; corruption; favoritism; queuing theory; uncertainty;All these keywords.
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