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The Empirical Content of Rational Choice Theory

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  • Gary W. Cox

Abstract

Green and Shapiro have argued that rational choice theory has produced virtually no new propositions about politics that have been carefully tested and not found wanting; and that an empirically successful rational choice theory would be no more universal than the middle-level theories that they advocate. In this essay I argue four main points. First, Pathologies of Rational Choice Analysis was much better designed to illustrate methodological failings than to sustain a global claim that rational choice theory has made no empirical contributions. Second, there is empirically confirmed content specific to rational choice theory, enough to make it the vital and exciting research program that it is. Third, there is a sense in which rational choice is more universal than its predecessors. Fourth, to provide a full evaluation of the scientific value of any theory one needs to consider both theoretical and empirical success.

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  • Gary W. Cox, 1999. "The Empirical Content of Rational Choice Theory," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 11(2), pages 147-169, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:11:y:1999:i:2:p:147-169
    DOI: 10.1177/0951692899011002001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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