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Disentangling the direct and indirect effects of the initiative process

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  • John Matsusaka

Abstract

Voter initiatives are important for policy making in many countries. While much research shows that the initiative process affects policy choices, almost no evidence explains how the initiative process affects policy. Initiatives might change policy directly through voters approving laws that override the legislature; or the initiative process may change policy indirectly by providing a threat that induces the legislature to change policy. This article develops an empirical strategy to measure the direct and indirect effects of the initiative based on the idea that direct effects can be inferred from states that actually pass initiatives while indirect effects can be inferred from states where the initiative is available but not used. Evidence from 50 states on nine separate issues suggests that both direct and indirect effects are important, but the direct effect is several times larger than the threat effect. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Suggested Citation

  • John Matsusaka, 2014. "Disentangling the direct and indirect effects of the initiative process," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 160(3), pages 345-366, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:160:y:2014:i:3:p:345-366
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-013-0130-6
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    Cited by:

    1. John G. Matsusaka, 2018. "Public policy and the initiative and referendum: a survey with some new evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 174(1), pages 107-143, January.
    2. Tomoya Tajika, 2018. "Signature requirements for initiatives," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 30(4), pages 451-476, October.
    3. Michael Mitsopoulos & Theodore Pelagidis, 2017. "A model of constitutional design and corruption," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 44(1), pages 67-90, August.
    4. David Altman, 2017. "The Potential of Direct Democracy: A Global Measure (1900–2014)," Social Indicators Research: An International and Interdisciplinary Journal for Quality-of-Life Measurement, Springer, vol. 133(3), pages 1207-1227, September.

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